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Chinese Mine Warfare
A PLA Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability

A

fter a lengthy hiatus—lasting nearly six centuries—China is reemerging as a
maritime power, this time with an emphasis on undersea warfare. Between 1996
and 2006, the Chinese navy took delivery of more than thirty submarines.1 These vessels include two new classes of nuclear submarines—the advanced Song-class diesel
submarines and the Yuan class of diesel boats—which, according to some reports, was a
surprise for U.S. intelligence.2 Above and beyond this ambitious naval construction program, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) received during 2005–06 an additional eight
formidable Kilo-class submarines (and associated weaponry), which were purchased in
2002, to add to the four it already operated. A new nuclear submarine base on Hainan
Island may well herald a new era of more extended Chinese submarine operations.
Much discussion among East Asian security analysts now centers on Beijing’s potential
development and deployment of aircraft carriers. However, at least in the near term, this
discussion amounts to a red herring. For the foreseeable future, China does not seek to
“rule the waves” writ large but rather is seeking the much narrower and more realizable
objective of dominating the East Asian littoral. While photos of a first Chinese carrier
will no doubt cause a stir, the Chinese navy has in recent times focused much attention
upon a decidedly more mundane and nonphotogenic arena of naval warfare: sea mines.
This focus has, in combination with other asymmetric forms of naval warfare, had a
significant impact on the balance of power in East Asia.
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) strategists contend that sea mines are “easy to
lay and difficult to sweep; their concealment potential is strong; their destructive power
is high; and the threat value is long-lasting.”3 Key objectives for a Chinese offensive mine
strategy would be “blockading enemy bases, harbors and sea lanes; destroying enemy
sea transport capabilities; attacking or restricting warship mobility; and crippling and
exhausting enemy combat strength.”4 For future littoral warfare, it is said that “sea mines
constitute the main threat [主要威胁] to every navy, and especially for carrier battle
groups and submarines.”5 Moreover, this emphasis corresponds to the PLAN evaluation
that “relative to other combat mission areas, [the U.S. Navy’s] mine warfare capabilities
are extremely weak.”6 Chinese naval strategists note that of eighteen warships lost or
seriously damaged since World War II, fourteen were struck by sea mines.7 As the PLA’s
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newspaper has stated, “When military experts cast their gaze on the vast sea battle area
. . . submarines attacking in concealment with torpedoes and the ingenious deployment
of mines are still the main battle equipment of a modern navy.”8 The prominent role of
“minelaying” in contemporary Chinese military doctrine is highlighted by the fact that
this term was used no less than three times in China’s 2008 defense white paper.9 While
many countries are vigorously studying mine countermeasures, few are so brazenly
pursuing offensive mine warfare.10 Thus, for example, the 2006 edition of Science of
Campaigns (Zhanyi Xue), an operationally and tactically focused Chinese doctrinal
textbook, declares, “[We must] make full use of [units] . . . that can force their way into
enemy ports and shipping lines to carry out minelaying on a grand scale.”11
In tandem with submarine capabilities, therefore, it now seems that China is engaged in
a significant effort to upgrade its mine warfare prowess. Submarines are large and difficult to hide, and various intelligence agencies of other powers are no doubt attuned to
the scope and dimensions of these important developments. By contrast, mine warfare
(MIW) capabilities are easily hidden and thus constitute a true “assassin’s mace” (杀
手锏 or 撒手锏)12—in the American metaphor, a “silver bullet” for the PLAN, a term
some Chinese sources, including the PLAN itself,13 apply explicitly to MIW.14 Relying
heavily on sea mines, the PLAN is already fully capable of blockading Taiwan and other
crucial sea lines of communication in the western Pacific area. As Thomas Christensen
writes, “The proximity of Taiwan to the mainland . . . Taiwan’s massive trade dependence
. . . the inherent difficulty in clearing mines, and the extreme weakness of American
mine-clearing capacity, particularly in [the Pacific] theater . . . all make blockade a
tempting . . . strategy for . . . China.”15 Indeed, sea mines, used to complement a variety
of other capabilities, constitute a deadly serious challenge to U.S. naval power in East
Asia. In demonstrating the above conclusions, this study directly challenges the findings of another recently published research article, which argues that PRC mine warfare
capabilities have been exaggerated and would not prove decisive in a Taiwan scenario.16
That study’s conclusions may have been reasonable at some time in the past, but they are
now quite obsolete and risk obscuring a major threat to U.S. naval forces operating in
the Asia-Pacific region.
This paper will proceed in ten steps. First, there is a discussion of the Persian Gulf War
as a catalytic moment for contemporary Chinese MIW. A second section develops
this context further with an account of the little-known history of Chinese MIW. The
next two sections consist of detailed descriptions of the PLAN mine inventory and the
various means of delivery. A fifth section addresses the human factor in Chinese MIW
development, outlining recent training and exercise patterns. The following section
offers a provisional outline of the PLAN’s evolving MIW doctrine. The seventh section
brings prospective mine countermeasures (MCM) programs into the strategic equation,
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and the eighth discusses specific scenarios of concern, especially the Taiwan blockade
scenario, aiming for a comprehensive net assessment of the MIW component in the future Asia-Pacific maritime security environment. The discussion of scenarios is followed
by an evaluation of an alternative viewpoint concerning Chinese MIW potential. In the
tenth, concluding, section, implications are discussed for U.S. defense and foreign policy.

A Catalytic Historical Moment for Chinese Mine Warfare
China effectively has no modern naval history. With the exception of the large Qing fleet
that suffered utter defeat during the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, PRC military theorists
are stymied by a paucity of domestic experience and firsthand knowledge concerning naval warfare. Most obviously, Chinese forces were conspicuously absent from the
massive fleet engagements that swept across the Pacific and into China’s littoral waters
during the Second World War. No wonder defense analysts habitually describe China as
a “continental power.”
Since 1978, however, consistent with China’s kaifang (开放) “open” orientation, PRC
specialists have been assimilating foreign experiences in a systematic effort to develop
naval analyses for planners. MIW campaigns figure prominently in these studies. According to a PRC textbook of mine warfare, 810,000 sea mines were laid during World
War II, sinking approximately 2,700 ships.17 Moreover, PLAN strategists keenly appreciate that in the same conflict Germany alone lost twenty-seven U-boats to Allied MIW.18
Also of great interest to Chinese naval strategists is the 1945 U.S. mine campaign against
Japan.19 Noting the distinct contribution of this strategy to Japan’s unconditional surrender, they observe that 12,053 mines were employed, causing the destruction of 670
Japanese ships.20 Chinese naval analysts have also examined the Falklands War, positing
that Argentina’s failure to use sea mines to counter the Royal Navy constituted a major
lost opportunity.21
Among the many military campaigns analyzed by PRC strategists, the Persian Gulf War
(1990–91) was singularly important, however, in shocking the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) out of a Deng Xiaoping–era malaise characterized by declining defense budgets,
low technology, and poor readiness. According to David Shambaugh, “In the PLA’s seventyyear history, only the Korean War produced such a thoroughgoing reassessment.”22
Describing the impact as a “jarring effect on the PLA,” Shambaugh explains: “[PLA]
planners had never imagined the application of the numerous new high technologies
developed by the United States. . . . Nearly every aspect of the campaign reminded the
PLA high command of its deficiencies.”23 There is a noteworthy caveat that has been
overlooked in such analyses but has major implications for Chinese naval development,
Chinese analysts having, not surprisingly, scrutinized all naval aspects of the 1990–91
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conflict carefully.24 That is, PRC writings concerning MIW almost universally cite the
damage mines caused to two U.S. Navy warships during that war.25
PRC specialist Fu Jinzhu, noteworthy for his prolific writings on all aspects of MIW and
MCM, published a detailed and comprehensive analysis of mine warfare in the Persian
Gulf War in the March 1992 issue of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
(CSIC) journal 现代舰船 (Modern Ships).26 Fu concludes that MIW played an unexpectedly large role, demonstrating conclusively that mines are one of the most effective
methods with which weak countries can defend against strong countries, though Fu is
careful to state that strong countries can also employ mines effectively.27 Fu contends
that the successful MIW attacks against USS Tripoli and USS Princeton illustrate the “relatively feeble” character of U.S. MCM. He argues that this is particularly true given the
apparent failures of Iraqi MIW, which Fu lists as inadequate planning and preparation,
inability to lay a sufficient quantity of mines (Iraq laid “only” 1,100 mines), and inappropriate reliance on moored mines, as well as failure either to conceal MIW operations
adequately or to conduct long-range MIW operations. While recognizing the distinctive
role of civilian vessels in Iraqi MIW, Fu concludes that coalition air superiority hindered
Iraqi MIW decisively by preventing air delivery of mines and by inflicting heavy losses
on Iraqi MIW assets. In addition, Fu asserts that this historical episode fundamentally
demonstrates the “extremely difficult nature of MCM” (反水雷艰巨性).
Similar themes are echoed in another lengthy examination of Gulf War naval operations.28 This analysis emphasizes the irony that whereas the Persian Gulf War is universally considered a “high-tech war,” a traditional weapon like the sea mine played a
significant role. This commentary notes the impressive cost-effectiveness of MIW, describing it as “cheap price, beautiful substance” (价廉物美). It also argues that sea mines
are particularly appropriate weapons for China, not only in a defensive sense, because
of its long and complex coastline, but also in an offensive sense, affording opportunities
to blockade enemy ports and break sea lines of communication.29 Like Fu Jinzhu, this
analyst emphasizes that Iraq’s experience can be improved upon, because “sea mines
should incorporate high technology” as well. Among the methods and technologies that
must be prioritized are counter-MCM equipment, “intelligized” (智能化) mines, rapid
laying of mines, and “high-volume carriers for mines” (多载体布雷手段). Like the piece
mentioned previously, this second study does not appraise coalition MCM highly: “Despite deploying 13 vessels from four nations, this force proved insufficient, was plagued
by wide discrepancies in the capabilities of each vessel, and made only slow headway
[against Iraq’s mines].”
A 2004 article written by Fu Jinzhu in the Chinese Society of Naval Architecture and
Marine Engineering periodical 舰船知识 (Naval and Merchant Ships) hints at the extent
to which the preceding and other related analyses have become conventional wisdom
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among PLAN strategists. It begins, “Everybody knows that during the 1991 Gulf War,
Iraqi mines played an important role, mauling [a number of] U.S. Navy warships.”30�
This piece analyzes MIW and MCM in the 2003 Iraq War and questions why the coalition MCM campaign was seemingly more effective then than in 1991. Noting that Iraqi
mines caused no coalition casualties, Fu calls the 2003 MCM effort a qualified success.
However, he notes that despite the introduction of various new systems (for example,
the AN/AQS-24 mine-hunting sonar), coalition MCM still suffered numerous problems.
He observes that in the first thirty-six hours of the MCM operation just six mines were
discovered (out of approximately ninety that had been laid) and that the most modern
MCM systems are still hindered by sea-floor clutter (i.e., false targets).31 Returning to a
theme of post–Gulf War analyses, Fu emphasizes Iraqi MIW failures that resulted from
absolute coalition control of the relevant air and sea zones. Fu underscores the promise
of MIW but notes the inherent difficulties of MCM, quoting the U.S. Navy officer in
charge of MCM operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom as saying: “Even in the most
optimal sea and combat operations environment, hunting and sweeping mines is slow,
causing frustration and danger.”32
In the long history of mine warfare, the 1991 Persian Gulf War appears to have made
a distinct mark on PLAN development. Western defense analysts have demonstrated
clearly that the Gulf War was a turning point in overall PLA development, spurring great
activity by its revelation of the apparent weaknesses of the Chinese armed forces compared to the capabilities of U.S. forces. However, Chinese assessments of Gulf War MIW
and MCM operations draw attention to a critical vulnerability in U.S. capabilities and
operations. That is, as one Chinese analyst writes in 2004 in China’s official Navy newspaper 人民海军 (People’s Navy) on the possible role of MIW in a U.S.-China conflict,
The U.S. will need to move supplies by sea. But China is not Iraq. China has advanced
sea mines. . . . This is a fatal threat to U.S. seaborne transport. . . . [T]he moment conflict
erupted in the Taiwan Strait, the PLA Navy could deploy mines. U.S. ships that want to
conduct ASW [antisubmarine warfare] [would] have to first sweep the area clear. When
the U.S. fought in the Gulf War, it took over half a year to sweep all Iraq’s sea mines.
Therefore, it [would] not be easy for the U.S. military to sweep all the mines that the PLA
[might] lay.33

In addition to these detailed assessments of foreign mine-warfare experiences, moreover,
China will be able to draw on some experience of its own.

Historical Development of Chinese Mine Warfare
Although the Persian Gulf War and other analyses of major MIW campaigns may give
additional impetus to Chinese MIW, it would be wrong to discount China’s rather
extensive, if largely unknown, history in that realm. China’s sea-mine development
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encapsulates the vicissitudes of its overall naval development—from ancient glory to
subsequent failure to current resurgence.34
It is noteworthy that China claims in fact to have invented naval mines,35 developing and
producing them in the Ming dynasty (mid-1500s)36 and deploying them widely thereafter.37 As early as 1363, the Ming were said to have used a split-hulled minelaying ship
in battle against the Han.38 In 1558, Tang Xun published Weapons Compilation, which
recorded in detail bottom-mine designs and methods of laying them to attack the pirates
who operated in Chinese littoral waters from the fourteenth century to the sixteenth.39
During the Qing dynasty, the Tianjin Sea Mine Academy was created,40 as part of an
ultimately unsuccessful attempt to restore China’s naval prowess and thereby defend its
territorial integrity.
Centuries later, during the Sino-Japanese War, the Red Army cooperated with the
Kuomintang (that is, Nationalist) navy to lay mines against Japanese shipping on the
Yangtze River.41 Following the PRC’s establishment in 1949, “navy officers discovered the
unique battle operations characteristics of sea-mine weapons: the duration of threat is
long, attack [is] conceal[ed], [and happens] unexpectedly.”42 The PLA used fishing boats
to clear Shantou Harbor of mines in 1949.43 In April 1950, the PLA had to establish a
minesweeping regiment to clear sea mines that the Kuomintang had laid in the Yangtze.
Under the guidance of Soviet experts, four landing warships refitted as minesweepers
successfully completed the mission in October of that year.44
Western and Chinese strategists are equally familiar with the allied minesweeping operation at Wonsan.45 Chinese sources show ample awareness of North Korea’s success in
laying three thousand mines and thereby temporarily denying the U.S. Navy access to
local littoral waters.46 Allied forces succeeded in sweeping or destroying only 225 of these
mines, and at heavy cost. Four U.S. minesweepers and one fleet tugboat were lost, and
five destroyers were severely damaged. Mines also sank the South Korean minesweeper
YMS-516 and damaged several other South Korean ships.47 Rear Admiral Allan Smith,
U.S. Navy, who led the advance force at Wonsan, summarized this episode: “We have lost
control of the seas to a nation without a Navy, using pre–World War I weapons, laid by
vessels that were utilized at the time of the birth of Christ.”48
The PLA engaged in its first MIW operations during the Korean War—a fact largely
overlooked in Western accounts. In February 1953, Beijing’s Naval Command Headquarters ordered a small contingent to create mine barriers to prevent American amphibious infiltration of communist territory. On 6 April a force of five ships reached the
Qingquan [sic] River’s mouth and attempted to lay mines according to Soviet doctrine
(though a variety of environmental factors forced adaptation and tactical innovation).49
After this modest beginning, communist combat operations in the Korean War gave
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Chinese MIW early impetus. The PLAN introduced Soviet sea mines and simultaneously
resolved to begin to manufacture copies of them.
National policy formulated during the Korean War dictated the purchase of various
types of foreign minesweepers after the conclusion of that conflict. A 1951 policy, which
would have lasting influence on PLAN development, called for China to “obtain from
the Soviet Union the technology transfer rights to manufacture naval vessels,” to “transition from copy production [of vessels] to semi-indigenous production,” and finally,
to proceed “step-by-step from semi-indigenous production [of vessels] to complete
[indigenous] production.”50 Accordingly, the PRC obtained and refitted World War II
minesweepers and acquired from the Soviet Union several minesweepers built in 1948.
Augmenting this initiative, China simultaneously pressed fishing vessels into service
to sweep mines and started construction of its first dedicated minesweeper. As a result
of a 1953 Sino-Soviet accord,51 Moscow transferred the plans and kits of Models 6605
and 6610 base minesweepers, which were subsequently assembled and constructed by
the Wuchang Shipbuilding Factory. These ships would begin serial production in the
1960s.52
In the mid-1950s, as directed by the 1956–67 Defense Science and Technology Development Plan,53 China began to develop a naval mine infrastructure. Beijing established
a Special Sea Mine Committee (水雷专业委员会), which directed these efforts, and
a Water Weapons Research Institution (水中武器研究机构), responsible for relevant
data collection and analysis.54 In 1958, Sha’anxi Province’s Fenxi Machine Factory began
indigenous production of China’s first mines, types M 1–3, which were copies of Soviet
models.
In 1956, the PRC began design work on its first indigenous minesweeper, Model 057K, at
the First Product Design Office of the Shipbuilding Industry Management Bureau of the
First Ministry of Machine Building Industry.�55 This first-generation harbor minesweeper
was built under the supervision of CSIC’s 708 Research Institute, primarily at shipyards
at Qiuxin, Zhonghua, and Jiangxin.56� In 1962, after extended sea trials, the first vessel
was delivered to the PLAN. China would later deploy this ship to Vietnam, along with
a ship of Model 058, the design work of which began in 1967. Accepted by the PLAN in
1972, this vessel was constructed of low-magnetic-signature steel and incorporated degaussing equipment (which reduces magnetic signature).57 Roughly fifty Type 312 drone
minesweepers were developed in the 1970s58—based on East German “Troikas”—for
riverine missions; some of these too would serve in Vietnam.59
Sea-mine development continued throughout the Cultural Revolution (1966–76),
spared perhaps by its relatively close alignment with Mao’s doctrine of People’s War.
Efforts to create a remote “Third Line” defense infrastructure capable of surviving Soviet
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nuclear attack devastated China’s military manufacturing and imposed tremendous inefficiencies, some of which persist to this day.60 A number of modular, highly simplified,
shallow-water mines, such as the C-4 and C-5 bottom mines, were developed.61 Mines
from this era were typically plagued by long development times; many later required upgrades to their fuses and general reliability. It is unclear what, if any, role these shallowwater mines play in China’s order of battle today.
On 9 May 1972, the U.S. Navy mined North Vietnam’s Haiphong Harbor. China responded immediately to a request from Hanoi for assistance, formally condemning the
blockade on 12 May.62 Chinese discussions of the unusual deployment into a war zone
that followed note that Chinese MCM at that time lacked experience; moreover, they
candidly concede, the Cultural Revolution was taking a major toll on the capabilities that
did exist.63 Later that month a PLAN mine investigation team (中国水雷调查工作队)
arrived in Haiphong and began to analyze captured U.S. mines. Between that July and
August 1973, the PLAN sent twelve minesweepers, four support vessels, and 318 men to
Vietnam.64 Sustaining severe injuries and at least one death, China’s minesweepers sailed
27,700 nautical miles and cleared forty-six American mines, using acoustic triggering,
divers, and other methods.65 These mine-clearing efforts, at the close of the Vietnam
War, familiarized the PLAN with U.S. MIW techniques and hardware. Lessons that the
Chinese took from America’s mine warfare against North Vietnam included the tactic of
laying aerial mines at night to increase surprise and the psychological warfare gambit of
“laying many mines and saying little or conversely laying few mines and saying a lot” (布
多说少, 布少说多).66 China subsequently used its MCM experience to help the Khmer
Rouge in Cambodia during 1974–75.67
In the 1970s, the PLAN solidified its capacity to produce basic, Soviet-type equipment.
This was an era of recovery; PLAN development capabilities were to advance significantly during the 1980s. Many previously envisioned assets would undergo successful
development and production; assets produced earlier would be improved by the incorporation of new technology. China’s first indigenously developed sea mine, the moored
M-4 mine, entered active service in 1974; improved variants emerged in 1982 and 1985.
The C-3, China’s first indigenous mine with sweeping resistance, entered active service
in 1974. Following fuse improvements, a C-3B variant was produced in 1986. In 1975
the design of the C-2 deepwater bottom mine, China’s first sea mine to use transistor
technology, was finalized. Subsequent variants would improve fuse sensitivity. A new
MCM vessel, the Model 082 harbor minesweeper, was called for in 1976. Construction
began in 1984, and in 1987 the ship entered active service.68
Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power in 1978 heralded defense budget cuts to foster economic
development but also a “reform and opening up” (改革开放) policy that encouraged
the PLAN to seek foreign technology and ideas comprehensively, for the first time

chinese mine warfare

9

in decades. As part of a “strategic transition” (战略转变) by the mid-1980s from the
partially obsolete People’s War doctrine to a focus on fighting limited, local wars under
high-technology conditions, and of a more general shift from a continental focus to
maritime territorial defense, the PLAN made the development of dedicated minelaying assets a priority. Following previous Soviet efforts, China began development of a
dedicated minelaying vessel. In 1988, after a lengthy design and testing process initiated
in 1981, a Type 918 minelayer, hull number 814, joined the fleet.69� Hull 814 reportedly boasts a multidirectional hoist for non-pier loading, a mechanized mine-transport
system, and advanced fire-control radar, and it can carry three hundred sea mines. It
is slow and relatively easy to detect and thus seems to lack an operational purpose; it
likely serves as a technological test bed. Perhaps this is why only one Type 918 has been
constructed to date.70�
Photo 1. Wochi-Class Mine Countermeasures Ship. Jane’s Fighting Ships lists six of these, which
are apparently built at two shipyards, and mentions that they are similar to, but five meters
longer than, the older T-43 Soviet-designed minesweepers that China built previously.

It would be a mistake to dismiss PLAN minesweeper development, however. Qiuxin
Shipyard is reported to have launched a “new class” of six-hundred-ton minesweepers on 20 April 2004.71 A daily newspaper published by the political department of the
PLA’s Guangzhou Military Region reports that in 2005 the PLAN made “achievements
of development of training and operational methods for new equipment represented
by new-type minesweepers.”72 Since 2005 the PLAN has taken delivery of two new,
indigenously built types of MCM vessels: six of the Wochi class, and an as-yet singleton Wozang class.73 Of particular interest, China Central Television’s military channel,
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CCTV-7, broadcast in early 2007 a feature on a Chinese MCM exercise, showing footage
of the Wozang deploying a tethered, remotely operated vehicle (ROV) for underwater
mine hunting, an apparent first for the PLAN.74 According to one mine warfare expert,
this ROV may not have sonar, but it seems able to deploy mine-neutralization charges
and likely has a cutter that can sever mooring lines for mines—rather like the U.S.
Navy’s Mine Neutralization System. Judging by appearance, however, it does not seem to
have been derived directly from Western MCM systems.75 An East Sea Fleet minesweeper
squadron76 conducted similar ROV-assisted MCM in 2008.77 Deploying mine-hunting
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) on a wide scale would indicate a major new
step for China’s MCM capabilities, which heretofore have been considered relatively
unsophisticated.
Photo 2. East Sea Fleet Minesweeper Squadron Commander Zhang Jianming with Mine-Hunting
Remotely Operated Vehicle. This remotely operated, tethered mine-hunting vehicle, superficially
similar to the Italian PLUTO system, has a cutting device in front of the “bubble” that can sever
mine mooring cables, has a camera inside the “bubble,” and can also probably deploy explosive
charges to neutralize bottom mines from the black metal racks on its underside.

A more direct legacy of the Deng-era modernization was a PLAN effort to accelerate
undersea warfare technology development. This effort actively sought assistance from
abroad, including, notably, torpedo technology from the United States. In the domain of
MCM, China is said to have acquired advanced sweeping technologies from Israel.78
Significantly, China began to develop rocket mines in 1981, producing its first in 1989.79
In the post-Tiananmen era, this focus has been bolstered by large increases in military
spending and by an increasingly powerful economy and robust national science and
technology infrastructure. Contrary to conventional wisdom, as represented in the
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United States by a major 2002 treatise on twenty-first-century naval warfare development published by the National Defense University,80 rocket mines, with their evolving
variants, have been part of the PLAN’s arsenal for two decades.

China’s Sea-Mine Inventory
China’s current mine inventory includes a wide array of lethal weaponry. Published, unclassified inventory estimates range from fifty thousand to a hundred thousand individual weapons.81 It is worth noting, however, that mines stocks are easily hidden; therefore,
these estimates must be treated with considerable caution.
Order of Battle
A recent PRC article claims that China has over fifty thousand mines, consisting of “over
30 varieties of contact, magnetic, acoustic, water pressure and mixed reaction sea mines,
remote control sea mines, rocket-rising and mobile mines.”82 See table 1 for a reported
list of current PRC sea mines. These range from the more primitive moored mines to
sophisticated bottom and rocket-propelled mines.
Moored Mines. The classic sea mine, which has been available to militaries since World
War I, remains a potent weapon, as the damage to the warships USS Tripoli and Samuel
B. Roberts in 1991 and 1988, respectively, demonstrates.83 A moored mine floats beneath
the surface of the ocean, tethered to the bottom by an anchor. It typically detonates upon
direct physical contact with a ship or through relatively primitive influence mechanisms.
Moored mines, such as China’s EM 31 and EM 32 models, are limited by the length of
their mooring cables or chains to waters shallower than two hundred meters.84 These
mines’ cables and simple detonation criteria make them relatively easy to sweep with
even unsophisticated minesweepers—once their presence is known.85
Drifting Mines. Also known as “free-floating” mines, these have been developed and produced in large numbers by the PLAN. China’s military has reportedly manufactured—
despite international legal concerns—at least three types of drifting mines, as one of its
large-volume categories of traditional mines. The current status of production, inventory, and deployment is unclear, however.
Drifting mines are envisioned as being used primarily to attack surface ships. Developed
by CSIC’s 710 Research Institute in Yichang, Hubei Province,86 and produced by Dalian
Crane Factory, the Piao-1 automatic, stabilized, deep-floating mine has large and small
models. It is used to attack medium and small surface ships, and it can be laid by military vessels or ordinary civilian ships. The Piao-1 was reportedly put into active service
in 1974. Its laying depth is two to twenty-five meters, its operational life is two years, and
its blast radius is ten meters. Piao-1 reportedly is easily concealed, its production cost

12

china maritime studies

Model

Fuse

Type

Laying
Platform

Case Depth
(Meters)

Mission/
Target

C-1 500

Audiofrequency,
magnetic induction

Bottom

Surface ships,
aircraft

6–30

Attack surface
ships &
submarines

Surface ships,
submarine
torpedoes

6–60

Surface ships,
submarines

6–50

1000

沉
C-2 500

Magnetic induction,
infrasonic (<20Hz)

Bottom

1000

C-3 500

6–100

Audiofrequency
magnetic induction

Bottom

1000

C-4

Magnetic induction,
infrasonic (<20Hz),
pressure

Bottom

C-5

Ultrasonic, pressure

Bottom

Attack large &
medium ships
in littoral sea

Surface ships,
submarines,
aircraft

6–50

Naval ships,
civilian craft,
hand

5–15

Attack
medium &
small ships,
“People’s War
at sea”

5–15

Attack
medium &
small ships

6–100

Attack large
& medium
surface ships,
submarines

Table 1. PRC Sea Mine Order of Battle.
Sources: Data for this table derived from Lin Changsheng, “Hidden Dragon in the Deep,” pp.
22–33; Ling Xiang, “Raise Mighty Chinese Sea Mine Warfare Ships on the Sea,” pp. 152–61;
Jane’s Underwater Warfare Systems, available at www.janes.com; and Mason, “Naval Mine
Technologies.”
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Dimensions/
Warhead

Life
(Years)

Dates

495 kg; 300
kg charge;
533 MM
diameter

4

Active service
1965

533 MM
diameter

2

Development
began 1965;
sea trials 1966;
design plan
finalized 1975

533 MM
diameter

2

11/1974
active service

Small, light
modular
design

4

Small,
modular,
short
cylindrical
lower section,
hemispherical
upper section:
210 kg

4

Variants

13

Technology

Institutes

Copied Soviet
noncontact
deep bottom
acoustic
induction
mine

710 Research
Institute;
Xia’an
East Wind
Instrument &
Meter Plant;
Fenxi Machine
Factory

Numerous
improvements
to solve silt
burying
reducing
sensitivity, etc.

China’s 1st
sea mine to
use transistor
technology

Designed,
710 Research
Institute,
Vanguard
Instrument &
Meter Plant;
produced,
Fenxi Machine
Factory

1982 fuse
improvements;
12/1986 C-3B
with 200 M
maximum
laying depth

China’s 1st
indigenously
developed sea
mine with
sweeping
& natural
interference
resistance

Designed,
710 Research
Institute;
produced,
Shanghai
Vanguard
Instrument &
Meter Plant

1976 design
plan finalized

Strong
sweepingresistance
capacity

Designed,
710 Research
Institute;
manufactured,
East Wind
Instrument &
Meter Plant

1973
development
succeeded;
1975 active
service

National
Technology
Achievement
Prize in 1978
for assisting
Khmer Rouge
seizure of
power in
Cambodia,
1974–75

Designed,
710 Institute;
manufactured,
East Wind
Instrument &
Meter Plant

1080 kg; 700
kg charge; 533
MM diameter
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Model

Fuse

Type

C-6

Magnetic
induction, pressure,
infrasonic (<20Hz)
audiofrequency

EM-52

Ultrasonic (>20kHz) Rocket
magnetic induction
propelled
straight
rising
Three fuses: on
duty, combat action
(acoustic), explode
(water pressure)

EM-53

Acoustic/magnetic,
magnetic influence

Laying
Platform

Case Depth
(Meters)

Mission/
Target

10–300

Surface ships

Bottom
influence,
remote
control

2–200

ASW/
antisurface
warfare
(ASUW)

6–60

Defend mine
battle arrays,
blockade
bays, straits, &
channels

EM-54

Selects target,
e.g., aircraft
carrier of
proper tonnage

EM-55

Active, acoustic,
passive

EM-56

Acoustic, seismic,
pressure

Mobile

Submarine
possible shorebased launch

45 max
13 km startoff capability,
floating
launch option

ASUW

EM-57

Acoustic, magnetic

Bottom
influence,
remote
control

Air, surface
ships

6–100

ASW/ASUW

500
1000

Advanced
range 730 km

MAFOS-1

M-1

Automatic
search and
identify type
Contact

Large
moored

Surface ships,
submarines

12–263

Large surface
vessels

M-2

Contact

Medium
moored

Surface ships,
submarines

15–110

Blockade
channels &
harbors

M-3

Contact

Large
moored

Surface ships,
submarines

12–430

Attack
submarines

锚
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Dimensions/
Warhead

Life
(Years)

Dates

Variants

Technology

15

Institutes

Copied Italian
MR-80 Series

Short, thick
torpedo shape,
length 3.7 M,
diameter 0.45
M, 629 kg, 140
kg charge

1

Development
initiated 1981,
rigorous tests
& prototype
revision
completed
1987,
succeeded
1989

Improvements
to increase
laying depth
(goal 500 M),
charge ongoing
since 1994

Development
initiated
1978; military
received
prototype in
1986

5 seconds
to surface at
maximum
planned depth
of 200 M, 80%
strike probability
against ships in
range, marketed
by China

Developed
under 710
Institute
management

Three function
states:
deactivated,
combat,
detonate for
maximum
tactical
flexibility
Developed by
China Ship
Research
Office
More advanced
version of
EM-52

380 kg

Marketed by
China
Marketed by
China

300 kg charge

500 kg

700 kg charge

1000 kg

Marketed by
China

1

Active
service 1962;
discontinued

M-1B, added
noncontact
fuse

Copied Soviet

Fenxi Machine
Factory

1

Active
service 1964;
discontinued

Added
noncontact
fuse

Copied Soviet

Fenxi Machine
Factory

1

Active
service 1965;
discontinued

Added
noncontact
fuse

Copied Soviet

Fenxi Machine
Factory
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Model

Fuse

Type

Laying
Platform

Case Depth
(Meters)

Mission/
Target

M-4

Acoustic, ultrasonic
(>20kHz)

Moored

Surface ships,
submarines

200

Blockade
deepwater
seas, attack
mediumsized ships &
submarines

M-5

Contact, timing,
audiofrequency

Rising

Piao-1/2

Contact

Drifting,
medium size
automatic
stable depth

Hand,
small boat,
fishing boat

2–8+

Attack
medium &
small ships

Piao-3

Acoustic, contact

Drifting

Submarines,
surface ship

2–7 oscillates
(+/- 1m)

ASUW

PMK-1

Influence, timing,
audiofrequency

(Rocket?)
Propelled
Torpedo

Surface ship,
submarines

200–400
(1000 M
anchor depth)

ASW/ASUW

PMK-2

Passive, active,
acoustic

(Rocket?)
Propelled
warhead
encapsulated
torpedo

Air,
submarines,
surface ship

400 M
(Anchor depth
100–1000M)
close-tether
capable

ASW

T5

Acoustic, magnetic
induction, pressure

Selfnavigating

Te 2-1

Remote control
“safe/combat/
detonate” functions

Remote
control

漂

200

6–65

特

Type 500

500型
Xun-1

训1

Can select among
C-1, -2, and -3 fuses

Deep
training mine

Aircraft, esp.
PLAN Aviation

Practice
minelaying
over sea

Bottom
training mine

Submarines

Practice sublaunched
minelaying
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Dimensions/
Warhead

Life
(Years)

Dates

Variants

Technology

Institutes

600 kg

2

Design
finalized
11/1973; active
service 1974

M-4A 1982,
increase
buoyancy &
fuse stability;
M-4B 11/1985,
fuse circuit
integration
improvements

China’s 1st
indigenously
developed
mine; 1st
noncontact
deepwater
ultrasonic
mine

Designed,
710 Research
Institute;
manufactured
Fenxi Machine
Factory

Elongated
projectile,
low volume,
125–150 kg

2

130 kg

Limited
maximum inwater life

China’s original
Piao-1 lacked
the capacity
to distinguish
between enemy
and friendly
platforms,
was difficult
to use, and
may have been
discontinued

Designed,
710 Research
Institute;
produced,
Dalian Crane
Factory

350 kg

Russian made

110 kg TNT
equivalent

Russian
made, based
on MPT1M thermal
torpedo

Development
initiated 1978

Assistance
from Shanghai
Jiaotong
University
& Naval
Engineering
Academy

Shanghai
Vanguard
Instrument &
Meter Plant,
Shanghai
Electric
Equipment
Automation
Research
Institute, Navy
Test Base

Design plan
finalized
12/1987

Retrievable

710 Institute,
Fenxi Machine
Factory, Naval
Aviation
Division

Development
succeeded
11/1982

Floats to
surface after
exercise

710 Research
Institute,
Fenxi Machine
Factory
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is low, it possesses the capacity to resist sweeping, and it can drift at a predetermined
depth.
The Piao-2 small, automatic, stabilized, deep-floating mine was also designed by the
710 Research Institute and produced by the Dalian Crane Factory. Piao-2’s exterior is a
lengthened projectile, its volume is relatively small, its net weight is 125–50 kilograms,
it floats at a fixed water depth, and it is primarily used to attack medium and small
surface ships. Piao-2 can break down into sections in order to facilitate laying by hand,
by such simple platforms as small boats and fishing boats. Piao-2 was originally designed
for littoral warfare and blockading sea-lanes. There are also indications that China has
Photo 3. Piao Drifting Mine. The PLAN has produced large numbers of free-floating mines,
although the current status of production, inventory, and deployment is unclear.

developed a third-generation drifting mine, the Piao-3, that oscillates at a depth of
between two and seven meters.87 Such drifting mines might be particularly useful for
denying surface vessels access to waters east of Taiwan, particularly those too deep for
rising mines.
According to some Chinese sources, the PLA has already halted development of drifting
mines, because they are difficult to control.88 But a 2007 Chinese textbook on mine warfare contains an extensive discussion of drifting mines.89 Also, an image of what appears
to be a modern sea mine, labeled as a “drifting mine,” recently appeared on CCTV-7.90
China’s actual actions and calculus concerning the development of drifting mines remain ambiguous, however. The editor of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies
journal 国际展望 (World Outlook) notes that “drifting mines . . . can be used to attack
both navigating ships and anchored ships at such installations as bridges and ports.
Drifting mines are not restricted by water depth or sea area, may frequently float out
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of the maritime battle space, and can injure nonbelligerent countries’ ships. Therefore,
international treaties ban the use of drifting sea mines. Of course, actual conditions
are really not so ideal.”91 Indeed, drifting mines are clearly unlawful under the widely
recognized law of armed conflict, primarily because of their indiscriminate nature: they
can just as easily destroy civilian merchants as legitimate military targets. Also, they are
impossible to keep track of. Saddam Hussein was roundly condemned for using them
in the Gulf War (1990–91). Only drifting mines that became inert shortly after release
could possibly be lawful—but even then, the fact that they contain dangerous chemicals
and remain adrift would make them questionable at best.92
China’s most recent known equivalent to an operations-law handbook notes that the
1907 Hague Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact
Mines (关于敷设自动触发水雷公约) restricts sea-mine use but that signatories have
violated these restrictions extensively in World War II, “thereby seriously undermining
the rules of the Convention.”93 Ultimately, these Chinese analysts conclude that national
interests inevitably trump legal norms. One could therefore imagine the PRC using a
definition of “territorial integrity defense” to claim exemption from such international
norms in a conflict over Taiwan.94
Bottom Mines. As their name implies, these mines lie directly on the bottom of the ocean
and detonate when they sense passing ships’ magnetic, electric, acoustic, or pressure
signatures that satisfy their triggering criteria.95 These mines are dangerous and effective
weapons, as the damage to USS Princeton in 1991 during Desert Storm attests. Some of
the PLAN’s rudimentary bottom mines, such as the Types 500 and 1000, are assessed
as having a ship-counting feature and can let up to fifteen ship signatures pass before
detonating. They also have activation-delay mechanisms that allow their placement up
to 250 days before arming, and self-destruction timers that can be set for up to five hundred days.96 China’s C-series bottom mines have evolved from mid-1960s development
of relatively shallow moored mines to post-1975 development of deeper, multiple-fused
variants of increasing sophistication.97 Bottom mines like China’s EM-11 and EM-53
are significantly harder to detect and remove from waters than are moored mines.98 In
1991 one mine professional wrote, “It is now virtually impossible to sweep a mine which
requires magnetic, acoustic, and pressure influences properly sequenced in time.”99 The
710 Research Institute is reported to have recently developed with Pakistan a newgeneration bottom mine with sensitive fuses.100 Due to their limited sensing ranges and
charges, bottom mines are confined to waters of two hundred meters and shallower.101
Remotely Controlled Mines. Some mines can be deactivated by coded acoustic signals
to allow the safe passage of friendly vessels, and reactivated to oppose the transit of
enemy vessels. Research on this capability is evident in Chinese technical publications.102
China is thought to be able to control its EM-53 and -57 bottom influence mines in this
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manner.103 Remotely controlled mines are well suited to defensive mining purposes, but
they could be useful in offensive operations as well.
Submarine-Launched Mobile Mines. China possesses an inventory of mines, such as the
EM-56, that travel autonomously to their final target area.104 Called “self-navigating
mines” (自航水雷) in Chinese, these mines are simply torpedo bodies that carry mine
payloads to waters inaccessible by other means. Typically derived from obsolete torpedoes (e.g., earlier models of China’s Yu series) and launched from submarines, they
travel along a user-determined course for a set period of time. When they arrive at their
programmed destination (perhaps in the middle of a harbor), the torpedo’s engine
shuts off and the weapon sinks to the bottom, where the warhead is controlled by a fuse
similar to that of any other bottom mine. Like most mines, these are limited to shallow
waters.
Rising Mines. Another class of mines, known as “rising mines,” can be used in deep waters. A Northwest Polytechnic University dissertation on rocket rising mines states that
they “can be used in deep water [for] large control of sea” and are suited for the conditions of China’s maritime environment.105 Such a mine is moored but has as its floating
payload a torpedo or explosive-tipped rocket that is released when the system detects a
suitable passing ship. The torpedo, or rocket, rises from depth to home in on and destroy
its intended target, typically a submarine. As one source notes, “The so-called ‘directional rocket rising sea mine’ is a type of high technology sea mine with accurate control
and guidance and initiative attack capacity. . . . Attack speed [e.g., against a target submarine] can reach approximately 80 meters per second.”106 Rising torpedo mines such as
the PMK-2, which China has imported from Russia, are said to be capable of being laid
in waters as deep as two thousand meters.107 Improvements in cable materials might
extend maximum anchor depth even deeper. China has likewise acquired Russia’s earlier
PMK-1 version, and it could be working to reverse-engineer indigenous variants. China
has also developed, and now offers, at least two rising mines for export.108 Its EM-52
rocket rising mine, of which Iran purchased an unknown quantity in 1994,109 reportedly
has an operating depth of at least two hundred meters.110
Recent focus on rising-mine development indicates the existence in the PRC of “a new
understanding of the art of sea mine warfare: it is essential to implement effective sea
mine warfare over a vast range of deep sea areas [and to] develop and equip rocket sea
mines capable of . . . mobile attack.”111 The PLA is augmenting its existing inventory of
1970s and ’80s mines, designed to defend littoral areas against Cold War superpower
attack; most of these weapons “can only be deployed in shallow seas,” and only a fraction of them can be deployed in medium depths. The PLA has “started to outfit vertical
rocket rising sea mines, and is energetically developing directional rocket sea mines,
rocket rising guided missile sea mines and rocket assisted propulsion sea mines.”112
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Russian Influence
Lingering defense-industrial-complex inefficiencies are unlikely to restrain China’s seamine development prospects, because what the nation cannot develop indigenously it
likely has already procured from Russia. China has obtained Russian sea mines, technology, and quite probably engineers to bolster its indigenous MIW programs.113 Since the
end of the Cold War MIW technology has rapidly proliferated, “compounded by the
availability of ex–Soviet bloc expertise in mining technology and employment on the
world market.”114 An article in China’s leading naval publication refers to Russia as “the
world’s ‘sea mine kingdom.’”115 Fu Jinzhu believes that Russia’s sea-mine achievements
surpass even those of the United States and United Kingdom.116 Chinese analysts cite
three factors explaining Russia’s prowess in MIW: the existence of natural (geographical) barriers amenable to MIW, the ability to fight off superior naval opponents, and the
ability to produce large numbers at low cost.117 Obviously, this analysis amounts to an
argument for robust Chinese MIW. Moreover, Chinese strategists have studied Russian and Soviet MIW campaigns in considerable detail.118 These analyses examine the
role of mines in such historical campaigns as the Russo-Turkish wars and the RussoJapanese War. A plethora of articles examine the vital role played by the approximately
eighty thousand mines laid by the Soviet Union in the Second World War.119 Along the
same theme, an extremely meticulous analysis that appeared recently in World Outlook
contains a detailed map of Soviet, German, and Finnish minefields laid in the Gulf of
Finland during 1941.120
China has combined useful new hardware with a sophisticated understanding of the
history of Soviet mine development and doctrine. Chinese analysts note that Soviet
interest in sea mines actually waned under Premier Nikita Khrushchev but was subsequently reinvigorated in the late 1960s, as it was realized that for conventional-war
scenarios mines would play ever greater roles.121 Another Chinese source emphasizes
that Russia “has continuously paid great attention to the development of high-speed
undersea rocket technology.”122 Russian rocket mines (e.g., the PMK-1), according to
this and other Chinese analyses, are ideal for their intended purpose of targeting U.S.
nuclear submarines. It is said that these weapons, which close for a kill at fifty meters per
second, attack SSNs (nuclear-powered attack submarines) too rapidly to be engaged by
countermeasures. They are also rated as highly effective against the monohull construction of U.S. submarines. By deploying such weapons, it is said, even comparatively old
diesel submarines can challenge nuclear submarines—a traditional Soviet strategy.
PLAN training apparently using Romeo or Ming submarines to lay EM-52 rocket rising
mines in enemy ports, for example, suggests a wartime mission for these older submarines and could explain China’s retaining them.123 There are reports of Russian scientists
working on Chinese MIW programs.124 In this domain of warfare, Russia’s wide-ranging
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assistance has been a natural fit for PLA priorities, yet the true scope of this collaboration remains unknown.
Research Vectors
The PLAN constantly seeks foreign equipment, technology, and expertise to support its
rapid MIW development. But China is not content simply to acquire advanced Russian
and other foreign mines. As part of its larger scientific and technological revolution,
China has achieved a profusion of promising MIW research results. Ongoing research
foci confirm that China is keenly interested in developing and enhancing the effectiveness of deepwater rising mines.125 China began to develop rocket rising mines in 1981,
producing its first in 1989. Researchers at Qingdao Submarine Academy have recently
calculated how many mobile mines are necessary to blockade given sea areas.126 Indeed,
there is extensive research on submarine-launched mobile mine (SLMM) effectiveness,127
especially in relation to obstacles or countermeasures.128 Scientists at China’s Naval
Aviation Engineering and Dalian Naval academies have developed methods to predict
rocket-propelled-mine attack probability.129A variety of additional studies have analyzed
launch platform stability,130 underwater rocket propulsion,131 and launch trajectory.132
Like other countries, China models mine warfare extensively. Areas include “mine blockade warfare,”133 MCM,134 and warship magnetic fields.135 Some key mathematical models
underpinning Chinese MIW and MCM are “based on fifty years of PLAN research and
that of foreign navies.”136
China’s 710 Research Institute has been at the center of sea-mine development for
decades. In recent years, researchers there have studied fuse-triggering137 and imagery issues;138 designed a USB-based “large capacity internal recorder” for sea mines;139
and, in partnership with a university and a multinational corporation, developed and
implemented a “sea mine depth measurement and control system.”140 Of particular note,
they advocate the utilization of “national military standards” (国家军事标准) in mine
software development.141 In a similar vein, a student at Harbin Engineering University
calls for the development of a reliable “military automatic test system” (军用自动测试
系统) to ensure weapons readiness.142 Additional sea-mine research examines such issues
as target tracking,143 blast radius144 and maximization,145 as well as damage to ships.146
Researchers at one of China’s top technical universities have analyzed the extent to which
targets can react to and evade deepwater rising mines,147 and they suggest using the passive signatures of target vessels to aim the mines.148
Submarines have attracted particular attention as launch platforms for rising mines;
an article by Dalian Naval Academy researchers suggests significant PLAN interest in
SLMMs.149 A 705 Institute researcher advocates acquisition of an encapsulated torpedo
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mine, similar to the U.S. Cold War–era Captor, which could be laid in very deep waters
to attack passing submarines.150 Technical efforts are validated through field testing:
Submarine testing of a certain new type of mine was being conducted in the South China
Sea. Testing area senior engineers Zhang Zhaokui and Jin Shujun in succession spent more
than two months working inside a cramped torpedo launch compartment, precisely gathering each group of data. The Navy’s Military Training Department later compiled that
extremely valuable technical reference data into an operations handbook, thus providing a
scientific basis for the use of the new equipment.151

Fusing is another major area of PRC research. Mine designers addressed the problem
that early mines were easy to sweep by creating more sophisticated fusing systems. China
is retrofitting its older mines into modern, highly capable versions that are virtually
impossible to sweep.152 This preserves the operational relevance of China’s vast reserves
of otherwise obsolete mines. The resulting “smart,” or “intelligized,” mines are more resistant to MCM and can selectively target specific ship types.153 One significant research
vector is digital fusing,154 using neural networks as a means to improve resistance to
sweeping.155 Researchers at the 710 Research Institute and Naval Engineering University
discuss methods for improving pressure sensitivity in mine fusing.156 Other research involves improved methods for detecting weak magnetic fields of ships.157 China’s M series
of anchored mines illustrates this evolution: while the first two variants of early 1960s
vintage are no longer in use—presumably because they are easily swept—the M-4A and
-B versions were upgraded in the 1980s to incorporate newer, more sophisticated fuses.
Advanced fuses provide further utility for even more capable bottom mines. Using these
and other measures, the PLAN constantly adapts to the increasing sophistication of
foreign MCM.158 As the PLA’s newspaper reports:
The testing area not only supports shooting at targets, the collection of a great deal of
scientific research data also depends on them. In testing for design finalization of a new
type of mine, after release the mine did not operate according to the stated goals, and the
measurements and recordings by its associated “black box” were blank. Yet the target
range’s measurement instruments with the same interface recorded all sorts of data with
perfect clarity. The conclusion from the target range’s scientific analysis was that there
was a flaw in the design of the mine’s “brain,” its electronic system. Thus, the target range
sent the mine back to be “melted down as scrap.” A year later, a smart mine with excellent
performance was finally assessed as up to standard.159

Aerial minelaying is a topic of increasing interest. It is noteworthy, for example, that
two of five universities involved in a collaborative project to develop a textbook on
mine warfare that was published in 2007 are affiliated with aerospace research, including the Northwest Polytechnic University and the Beijing University of Aeronautics and
Astronautics.160 The Research Institute of Pilotless Aircraft has studied mine-parachute
trajectory parameters.161 Space technology has been applied to parachute design.162
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Researchers at Northwest Polytechnic University and Zhongbei University have recently
published several studies that model the impact of an air-dropped mine hitting the
water.163 Another Chinese specialist has created sophisticated mathematical models to
determine the optimal parameters for aerial minelaying.164 Here, as in other areas, efforts
are made to use field testing to determine optimal approaches in practice:
The testing area adopted a series of measures for close contact and cooperation with
R&D organizations and units participating in the testing. It worked hard to establish a big
scientific research pattern for new equipment, a three-dimensional, R&D, testing, and use
pattern. A certain type of air-dropped torpedo had overall technical indices which were at
the world’s advanced level. But there was always the regret that a certain small component
would easily catch hold of the parachute, and when that happened the mine would plunge
straight into the water and break up. In light of this inadequacy, the testing area joined
with the scientific research organization and the industrial organization in a focused effort
which resolved this difficult problem.165

PRC analysts follow all aspects of U.S. Navy development carefully and are constantly
seeking U.S. vulnerabilities.166 Widespread Chinese mine-detection research,167 including work at Qingdao Submarine Academy on probabilistic MCM decision making168
and at Naval University of Engineering on pressure-mine triggering parameters,169
could also be applied in this area. Disturbingly, there is some discussion of a theoretical
nature in PRC naval analyses concerning the fielding of tactical nuclear weapons on sea
mines—for example, in the 2007 textbook on mine warfare mentioned above.170 One
such analysis, in the context of Russian MIW, notes that nuclear sea mines could sink
adversary nuclear submarines from a range of two thousand meters, while other nuclear
mines could destroy an aircraft carrier or other major surface vessel from seven hundred
meters.171 A second article finds that a nuclear payload is one logical method to increase
the destructive power of sea mines,172 while a third argues that nuclear MIW is especially
promising for future deepwater ASW operations. It concludes: “At this time, various
countries are actively researching this extremely powerful nuclear-armed sea mine.”173
An article in the July 2006 issue of the PLAN periodical 当代海军 (Modern Navy), in the
context of discussing potential future PLA Navy use of sea mines, also notes the potential combat value of nuclear-armed sea mines.174 There is additionally evidence of related
basic research, including a study on large explosions under water.175 Such weapons, in
addition to violating the 1971 Seabed Treaty, could contravene the PRC’s no-first-use
declaratory policy and undermine its historically centralized control of nuclear weapons.
While there is no direct evidence of the existence of such naval tactical nuclear weapons
programs in China, it will be important to monitor closely for any sign of work in this
direction.
Less destructive, but potentially much more useful operationally, are apparent efforts by
Chinese researchers to develop sea mines that are capable of downing aircraft, especially
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helicopters.176 One PRC analysis explains that helicopters are ideal for MCM because
of their seeming invulnerability. However, it further suggests, during MCM operations
helicopters typically fly at speeds of from eight to twenty-five knots and altitudes of
eighty to a hundred meters and that this provides the opportunity for an “anti-helicopter
rocket rising mine” (反直升机火箭上浮水雷).177 The mine would be triggered by the
helicopter’s acoustic signature.178 According to another source, “It is presently known
that the [710] Research Institute is in the advanced stages of developing a ‘rocket rising
guided missile sea mine.’”179 The 2007 mine warfare textbook appears to discuss such a
“rocket-type mine” (导弹式水雷), which would target surface ships in this new way.180
This mine seems considerably more complicated than the anti-helicopter mine and may
be able to strike surface ships as well as maritime patrol and other aircraft. According to
this conception, a missile is launched into the air by a sea mine and then held aloft by a
parachute until it can lock-on to the target. The author claims that this more advanced
mine has not yet entered the stage of engineering development but that the commitment
of the PLAN to this weapon is “unwavering . . . [so that] it is only a question of when
development will succeed.”181
With regard to these programs, it is worth noting that diagrams outlining both these
antiair-mine concepts are portrayed in a 2002 Chinese naval encyclopedia.182 In another
potential mine warfare innovation, China is reported to be pursuing a “rocket-delivered
sea mine” (火箭助投水雷) with 380-kilometer range that could be used to close adversary ports in a matter of hours.183 Together, these discussions amount to substantial hints
that China may well now be on the cutting edge of global sea-mine technology development.

Mine Delivery Platforms
China can deliver its mines by surface warships, submarines, aircraft, and converted
civilian merchant or fishing vessels. The PLAN practices with all such platforms.184
Surface Warships
Many of the PLAN’s surface ships are equipped to lay mines, including the four Sovremmeny destroyers (which can carry up to forty mines), twelve Luda-class destroyers
(thirty-eight mines), and approximately twenty-seven Jianghu-class frigates (up to
sixty mines). China would not use its most advanced frigate (Jiangkai II) or destroyer
(Luyang II/Luzhou) classes to lay mines, and indeed they do not seem to be equipped for
that mission. Many of the PLAN’s hundreds of “obsolete,” older, and smaller gunboats
(e.g., the Shanghai and Hainan classes), minesweepers, and torpedo boats can carry and
lay a handful of mines each. The PLAN’s dedicated mine warfare vessel (hull 814) can
reportedly carry up to three hundred mines.185 The advantages of using surface warships
to lay mines include their large carrying capacities, their trained crews, and the relative
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Model

Platform
Type

Mine Carrying
Capacity

Current
Number

Remarks

Coastal Minesweeper Type 082

Surface ship

10 M-1s or 8 C 1000s

2

Minelaying rails

Fleet Minesweeper Type 5, 10

Surface ship

10 M-1s or 8 C 1000s

37

Minelaying rails

Surface ship

12 M-1s or C 500s

2

Minelaying rails

Surface ship

12 M-1s or 8 C 1000s

?

Minelaying rails

Surface ship

60 M-1s or 51 C 1000s

?

Minelaying rails

Surface ship

Up to 60

12

Minelaying rails

Surface ship

Up to 60

7

Minelaying rails

Surface ship

Up to 60

3

Surface ship

Up to 60

3

Minelaying rails

Luda-Class Type 1 Model 051

Surface ship

38

10

Minelaying rails

Luda-Class Type 2

Surface ship

12 M-1s or 20 C 1000s

4

Luhai-Class 167

Surface ship

18 M-1s or 30 C 1000s

2

Luhu-Class 112, 113

Surface ship

18 M-1s or 30 C 1000s

2

Patrol Craft Type 037 IS

Surface ship

12 M-1s or C 500s

2

?

Shantou-Class Fast Gunboat

Surface ship

8 M-1s or 6 C 1000s

?

Minelaying rails

Surface ship

24 M-1s or 40 C 1000s

2

Minelaying rails

(T43)
Haiju-Class Submarine Chaser
Type 037 I
Houxin-Class
Submarine Chaser
Type 037
Huanghe-Class Landing Ship
Type 037
Jianghu-Class Type 1
Model 053-H
Jianghu-Class Type 2
Model 053-HI
Jianghu-Class Type 3
Model 053-HG
Jianghu-Class Type 5
Model 053-H II

Type 101
Sovremenny DDG

Table 2. PLAN Minelaying Platforms Order of Battle.
Sources: Data for this chart derived from Hai Lin, “Taiwan’s Own Military Affairs Experts’ Forecast,” pp. 17, 18; Jane’s Fighting Ships, available at www.janes.com; and Sinodefense.com.
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Model

Platform
Type

Mine Carrying
Capacity

Current
Number

Remarks

Wolei Mine Warfare Vessel

Surface ship

200 Ms

1

Minelaying rails

Golf-Class SSB

Submarine

40

1

Han-Class SSN

Submarine

28

4

Kilo-Class Type 636

Submarine

24 AM-1s

10

Kilo-Class Type 877

Submarine

24 AM-1s

2

Ming-Class SS

Submarine

28–32

11

Submarine

28–32

8

Romeo-Class Type SS33

Submarine

28

8

Shang-Class SSN

Submarine

28 (?)

2

Capacity likely
similar to Han’s

Song-Class SS

Submarine

24–30

13

Capacity likely
similar to Kilo’s

Yuan-Class SS

Submarine

24–30

3 (+
more
being

Capacity likely
similar to Kilo’s

H-6 Bomber

Aircraft

Up to 18 (?)

Estimates
vary—
possibly
100

JH-7/7A Fighter-Bomber

Aircraft

Up to 12 250 kg

Estimates
vary—
possibly
100

Type 035
Ming Improved Type
Type 035 G SS

built)

equivalents (?)
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simplicity of command and control. Disadvantages include a lack of stealth, limited
speed, and consequent vulnerability.186
Photo 4. Laying a Training Bottom Mine. A crane, adequate deck space, GPS, and a low sea
state are the conditions required to lay mines such as this bottom mine exercise shape.

Submarines
Chinese naval strategists appear to put
a high value on submarine delivery of
mines. For example, one analysis notes
that “during both world wars, all countries’ submarine forces undertook submarine mine-laying—the effectiveness
appears to have been outstanding.”187
Its author further states that “[submarines operating] in sea areas and
bastions controlled by the enemy can
lay offensive mines, creating a surprise
attack for enemy shipping and a threat
of long duration.”188 All of the PLAN’s
submarines can carry mines, including
the twenty or so obsolescent and noisy
Romeos, which can carry twenty-eight.
The approximately nineteen similar
but newer and less noisy Mings can
carry up to thirty-two, and the ten to twelve units of the modern Song class may carry
as many as thirty. The Kilos, of which China has twelve, can carry twenty-four mines.
The three or more new Yuans can probably carry up to thirty, and the four remaining
nuclear-powered Han-class vessels twenty-eight.189
PLAN submarines are said to use influence mines of the Chen-1, -2, -3, and -6 types,
“appropriate for use in the sea area immediately outside of harbor mouths”; the T-5 mobile mine, “appropriate for port channels and sea areas immediately outside a port”; and
the Russian-produced PMK-1 and the Chinese-developed Mao-5 rocket rising mines,
“appropriate for waters up to 15 kilometers outside a port.”190 As the following photo
indicates, the advanced PMK-2 has been added to this lineup as well. Mine belts
(潜艇外挂布雷舱)—external conformal containers designed to carry and release large
numbers of mines—can be fitted to submarines. One source states, “For the past few
years related PLA experts have expressed pronounced interest in submarine mine belts
. . . . The PLA very probably has already developed submarine mine belts.”191
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Photo 5. Submarine Mine. PMK-2 propelled mine being loaded onto Song-class diesel
submarine at Qingdao.

Having systematically analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of various minelaying
platforms, Chinese analysts appear to have concluded that submarine delivery of mines
is optimal for offensive mining missions, especially at long range. The advantages of
using submarines to lay mines include their stealth, their ability to lay mines precisely,
and their ability to penetrate difficult targets (perhaps by using mobile mines). It is additionally noted that the high accuracy and effectiveness of submarine delivery enable
the planting of fewer mines to achieve the same effect.192 According to one analysis,
“The restrictions imposed on submarines by air and naval forces are relatively small,
[so] penetrating the enemy’s rear area to lay mines is much easier.”193 Also, according
to another report, this platform “has the highest qualities of stealth and potential for
surprise . . . [because] a vessel set at a distance of 10–15 km outside of a harbor, in a sea
area with a depth of about 40 m, will be capable of launching an effective mobile mine
to penetrate a sea port.”194 Campaign Theory Study Guide, written by Chinese National
Defense University scholars, envisions using submarines, through “the timer feature
of sea mine weapons and covert means, [to] lay mines in the enemy’s main ports and
important channels so that they will start to function after the blockade goes into effect
. . . start[ing] about 10 days before the blockade goes into effect . . . 1–2 days in advance
would be appropriate” and to replenish mines surreptitiously when enemy ASW forces
confront inclement weather or leave coverage gaps.195
Disadvantages of submarine minelaying include limited payload, slow transit speed,
and high opportunity costs (since mines must be carried at the expense of torpedoes or
cruise missiles). Another disadvantage, as with surface warships, would be an opponent’s
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ability to detect a mass egress from port. One recent Chinese analysis claims that submarine minelaying exercises are increasing in volume and sophistication,196 and this theme
is explored in greater detail below.
Aircraft
Beijing’s more than a hundred H-6 bombers, though obsolete for many missions, can
each carry twelve to eighteen 500 kg sea mines.197 Whether the H-6 would be assigned to
this mission is unknown, but it has recently been used in a variety of minelaying drills.198
China’s limited inventory of H-5 bombers could also be pressed into a mining role
against Taiwan. China’s more than one hundred JH-7/7A fighter-bombers can each carry
up to twenty 250 kg bombs.199 According to People’s Navy, such aircraft can conduct
minelaying in “near seas” (近海)—that is, out to the First Island Chain, which extends
from the Japanese islands through Taiwan and the Philippines.200 All these aircraft, and
more, could just as easily carry mines, which might be nothing more than gravity bombs
fitted with magnetic or other fuses.201 According to one source, “the PLA’s current inventory of Chen-1 through Chen-6 influence mines and the Mao-1 through Mao-5 moored
mines are appropriate for aircraft delivery.”202 To this category can be added the sophisticated PMK-2. The advantage of aerial mining, as the U.S. military has understood since
1944, is the ability rapidly to emplace large numbers of mines and reseed minefields. The
primary disadvantages are the difficulties in establishing air superiority and the opportunity costs of using modern aircraft to perform the mining mission.
Although earlier analysts examined China’s ability to lay mines via surface ships and
submarines, no analysis has seriously considered whether China could sow its mines
by aircraft. Aerial mining has enjoyed dedicated platforms since the PLAN created
an aviation branch with a minelaying bomber division in April 1949.203 A mainstay
of Chinese maritime periodicals offers detailed accounts of how the United States
used aerial mines to hasten Japan’s defeat in World War II and later to paralyze North
Vietnamese shipping.204 A professor at the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Command College
makes similar points concerning the value of aerial MIW in an article in China’s most
prestigious military journal, the PLA Academy of Military Science publication 中国军
事科学 (China Military Science).205 Several Chinese technical papers discuss in minute
detail the more esoteric aspects of accurately placing naval mines by aircraft.206 In the
context of discussing PLA Navy aviation capabilities, Vice Regimental Commander Zhu
Guanghong, North Sea Fleet, recently stated that “seaplanes have excellent performance
at super-low altitude. They can carry out . . . harbor mine-laying missions.”207 A North
Sea Fleet aviation force shipboard aircraft regiment has even been credited with making
PLA aviation ASW history by for “the first time using an exercise mine from a helicopter
to hit an acoustic target” (首次直升机使用操雷打声靶).208 Both Gidropribor.com and
Jane’s currently discuss Chinese and Russian-equivalent mines in the context of their
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being laid from aircraft.209 A rather lengthy recent article in a Chinese naval journal discusses which mines in China’s inventory can be laid by air.210 Finally, Campaign Theory
Study Guide advocates “concentrated mine-laying from the air,” particularly in “areas
which submarines find hard to enter.”211 It stipulates that “the mine-laying blockade
force group” usually includes “naval forces and Air Force bombing aviation.”212 It is thus
quite clear that China grasps the utility of aerial MIW and is considering how specifically to employ it in combat.
Civilian Vessels
Complementing the robust capabilities described above are the thousands of Chinese
fishing and merchant vessels that could be pressed into service. In 2003, Rong Senzhi,
Deputy Commander, Yantai Garrison District, advocated in a journal affiliated with the
Academy of Military Science that civilian vessels be utilized for minelaying and minesweeping.213 China’s 2008 defense white paper lists “mine-sweeping and mine-laying”
as one of four primary PLA Navy Reserve forces.214 According to one article, “China
currently has 30,000 iron-hulled mechanized fishing trawlers (each vessel can carry 10
mines), and there are another 50,000 sail-fishing craft (each can carry 2–5 sea mines).”215
Science of Campaigns (2006) is quite explicit on this point: “Mine-laying missions are
usually assigned to submarine and aviation forces with relatively good concealment, but
privately owned boats can also assume . . . mine-laying missions.”216 Chinese writings
frequently mention the incorporation of civilian shipping into naval service for such
Photo 6. People’s Militia Laying Mines. These two civilian fishing vessels, which are ubiquitous
in the seas around China, practice deploying bottom mines as part of a larger “People’s Militia”
exercise at the PLAN base in Sanya in December 2004. Such exercises occur regularly at various
PLAN bases. GPS would allow accurate placement of mines in defensive minefields around
Chinese ports, even by militia forces such as these.
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functions as MIW.217 A 2005 article describes, with photos, the use of fishing vessels as
minelayers as part of larger “People’s Militia” exercises that occur regularly at various
PLAN bases.218
One Chinese source describes “fishing vessels with a displacement of around 100–200
tons” as ideally suited for MIW because they offer sufficient numbers, “small targets,”
reasonable mobility, and unsuspicious profiles.219 Fishing vessels of this size easily have
the endurance to range the entire East Asian littoral, including especially all waters surrounding Taiwan. Only “minor modifications” are needed to “install simple mine-laying
equipment. . . . Fishermen are very familiar with the sea” and may therefore exploit
“topographical conditions, surface features, and darkness.”220 Another Chinese source
observes, “The PLA has effectively organized and commands motorized fishing trawlers,
which during war time can be equipped with minelaying rails, and, relying on an excellent
disguise, can execute mine warfare.” The same source concludes, “This non-conventional
type of mine delivery platform, although unable to plant many mines, when used in
large numbers or for reseeding, can also produce a large number of minefields.”221 It is
perhaps not surprising to see one of China’s prominent naval strategists, Senior Captain
Li Jie of the PLAN’s Naval Military Studies Research Institute, writing on the subject of
new developments in undersea weaponry for the PLA-sponsored journal China Militia
as recently as May 2008.222 In addition, an extensive legal basis has been developed to
support the mobilization of civilian vessels in wartime, including the National Defense
Transportation Regulations, which were promulgated in 1995, and the National Defense
Law of the People’s Republic of China of 1997. This legislation was apparently updated
again in 2003, according to a PLA Navy article.223 MIW could thus support the ultimate “People’s War at Sea.”224 China, therefore, has all the physical elements required to
perform aggressive MIW, including a large inventory of increasingly capable mines and
a wealth of platforms from which to lay them. But this is only part of the story. Hardware is ineffective without the human capital and experience that can be cultivated only
through training and exercises.

China’s Increasingly Realistic Mine Warfare Exercises
The PLAN places a premium on exercises involving sea mines.225 Bernard Cole, an expert
on the PLAN, has noted that unlike their counterparts in many other navies, Chinese
surface combatants annually practice minelaying but expresses uncertainty regarding
how extensive the exercises actually are.226 Newly available data indicate that the PLAN
is in fact making serious efforts to expand such exercises and make them realistic.227
Recent Chinese MIW exercises have involved submarine, air, surface, and even civilian
platforms extensively. Such exercises are documented in some detail in the PLA Navy’s
official newspaper, People’s Navy.
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China’s navy considers minelaying from submarines to be “the most basic requirement
of submarine warfare.”228 Minelaying has become an integral component of recently enhanced PRC submarine force training229 in which crews strive to conduct a wider variety
of increasingly challenging exercises attuned to local environmental, hydrographic, and
weather conditions.230 In particular, China’s navy views submarine-delivered mining as
a critical aspect of future blockade operations.231 By 2002, minelaying had become one
of the most common PLAN submarine combat methods. Accordingly, crews train to
handle submarines loaded with large quantities of mines.232 Drill variants include “hiding and laying mines in deep water”233 in combination with such operations as torpedo
launch.234 Broad, deep minelaying against port targets is also emphasized,235 with the
assumption that penetrating enemy defenses is a prerequisite.236
PLAN officers recognize the challenges inherent in “penetrating the enemy’s antisubmarine forces and laying mines behind enemy lines.” According to one captain,
“Secretly penetrating the combined mobile formation deployed by the enemy’s antisubmarine forces is a prerequisite to fulfilling the mine-laying task.”237 There is some
evidence that China may rely on centralized control of its submarines conducting
offensive mining missions. In carrying out offensive mine blockades, notes one PRC
analysis, “most submarine forces operate primarily in a single-submarine, independent
mode, and if there is a shore-based submarine command post to handle command and
guidance of the submarine for its entire course, it will not only ensure its concealment
but also improve the strike effectiveness of the mines . . . that are laid.”238
The Chinese navy is working hard to improve the quality of its submarine officers and
sailors, including their proficiency in MIW. Midlevel command students at Qingdao
Submarine Academy study minelaying intensively.239 Submarine flotillas have practiced
“difficult new tactics like ‘minelaying in great depth,’”240 and continue to set new depth
records using such techniques as the “‘deep concealed mine laying’ combat method”
(“大深度隐蔽布雷” 战法).241 China’s official radio has cited PLAN submarine detachment torpedo and mine officer Chao Chunyi for achieving sixteen research results in
underwater minelaying training, cutting mine-loading time in half, and developing a
mine movement control device.242 Ma Lixin, the commander of Song submarine 314,
and a celebrity in China’s naval press, recently led an East Sea Fleet submarine detachment in “develop[ing] tactical innovations.” In the previous year, Ma had researched and
developed over ten new operational methods, “including how to carry out a blockade
and how to lay mines using conventional submarines.” In early 2005 Ma “led his unit
to participate in live exercises at sea. . . . [T]hey arrived at a designated area to . . . [lay]
mines.”243 In an early 2005 mine exercise, Ma was charged with evading “enemy” ASW
airplanes, a minefield, and—most difficult of all—an adversary submarine, in order
to lay mines in a nearby area. He used his mastery of the local environment, adopted
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a minimum-noise navigation speed, eluded the “enemy” submarine and shore radar,
and accomplished the minelaying mission on time.244 Naturally, handling mines safely
aboard submarines is an important research area at Qingdao Submarine Academy.245
Another analysis discusses the inherent safety issues involved with laying mines through
bow torpedo tubes—the customary method in modern submarines.246 One of the most
interesting articles surveyed to date details the 12 March 2006 “test launching” (水雷试
射) of what appear to be SLMMs by a “new type of submarine” (新型潜艇) in the South
Sea Fleet. Although it was the first such test by this type of submarine, with little room
for error, great accuracy was reportedly achieved. 247
China’s air components practice mine operations with increasing frequency, scale, and
diversity. The 1997 U.S. Department of Defense report on PLA development mentions
that China’s military aircraft practice laying mines by air.248 Training programs of East
and South Sea Fleet aviation regiments have recently included minelaying,249 incorporating different types of aircraft250 and conditions of enemy air blockade.251 A South Sea
Fleet exercise in August 2002 entailed dropping mines from bombers in an unfamiliar
location under “realistic” conditions against opposition forces. The exercise involved
a combat aircraft group consisting of three bomber sections, an electronic-jamming
aircraft, and escort fighters. The electronic-warfare aircraft jammed the enemy’s radar,
while the combat-aircraft group employed minimum-altitude tactics, quickly dispensing
several tens of mines and torpedoes.252 Another source, probably reporting on the same
exercise, discusses “Red force” bombers conducting a minelaying mission over the South
China Sea being intercepted and attacked by “Blue force” fighters.253 Starting in March
2006, a South Sea Fleet bomber regiment practiced laying “mine blockades far out at sea”
(远海布雷封锁).254 On 6 June 2006, as part of “a simulation training event on carrying
out a missile attack on a deep-sea island under poor weather conditions” (复杂气象条
件下远海岛礁导弹打击模拟演练), a South Sea Fleet Naval Aviation air regiment “laid
sea mines” (海上布雷). Its pilots were also trained in “laying mines far out at sea in the
fog” (雾天远海布雷).255 Also in 2006, a South Sea Fleet Naval Aviation air regiment
practiced “laying mines at sea in the rain” (雨天海上布雷).256 In late August 2008, four
recently retrofitted South Sea Fleet aviation force warplanes simulated “offensive minelaying in ports and sea lanes” “under a complex electromagnetic environment” and various weather contingencies.257 In early January 2009, an East Sea Fleet H-6 bomber regiment, in accordance with the new Outline for Military Training and Evaluation, “applied
new combat methods to training in deep defense penetration in distant seas and completed the low-altitude offensive mine-laying mission.” The regiment “explored some
new combat methods, such as . . . nighttime large-armada offensive mine-laying.”258 Also
in 2009, CCTV-7 stated that PLA Naval Aviation “water aircraft” “are capable of carrying
out . . . minelaying.”259
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A disturbing component of PLAN minelaying is the prospect of civilian cooperation to
supplement military assets. For the past few years, each navy unit has organized militia
units—which constitute “an important force in future maritime warfare”—into training equipment, management, applications, and safeguard groups to give them experience and develop new methods “to fulfill mission requirements.” China’s 2008 defense
white paper explicitly mentions that reserve forces are likely to be involved in mine
warfare (both laying and sweeping).260 An East Sea Fleet exercise using civilian vessels
includes a focus on clearing various types of mines.261 A Chinese maritime periodical offers perhaps the first photo available showing the use of civilian ships for MIW.
In December 2004, the Sanya navy militia’s emergency repair and minelaying detachments262 mobilized six civilian ships and conducted a drill that involved (among other
activities) reconnaissance, “minelaying by fishing boats,” and non-pier and at-sea supply
of naval vessels in battle.263 In early July 2006, the PLAN’s first reserve minesweeper
squadron, established in Ningbo, Zhejiang Province, in September 2005,264 conducted a
month of training in the East China Sea. Following an “emergency recall order” (紧急
征召命令), two hundred PLAN reserve officers and enlisted personnel prepared sixteen
requisitioned fishing boats within half a day. Two principal officers led training in seven
areas, including “shift of a command post [指挥所转移], air defense dispersal [防空
疏散], minesweeping [扫雷], [and] countering special combat operations [反特种作
战].” Coordinated by the East Sea Fleet party committee, the experimental effort was
supported by a wide variety of local organizations and drew “reserve enlisted personnel from among local fishermen and retired military personnel.” It was organized with
attention to economic realities: “To keep one high-horsepower fishing boat tied up at a
pier for one day costs several thousand RMB [hundreds of dollars]. The loss of one fishing trip costs over 100,000 RMB [USD 12,500].”265 Later in 2006, Penglai City (Shandong
Province) established a minelaying militia combat detachment, with assistance from
fishery departments and companies. This was in accordance with the PLA General Staff
Department’s “Opinion on Restructuring Militia Forces” (关于调整民兵组织的意
见).266 In March 2007, an East Sea Fleet minesweeper unit conducted joint MCM operations with fishing boats outfitted with minesweeping devices.267 Continuing this pattern,
in December 2008 a Navy Reserve squadron practiced rapid minelaying under difficult
conditions.268
Another report details the equipment requirements (e.g., cranes) for remote port loadouts of mines, presuming the difficulty during a conflict of relying on wharves at major
naval bases, which perhaps would have been destroyed by enemy precision-guided
munitions strikes.269 This training imperative is described in multiple publications as a
“non-pier” (无马头) exercise. According to People’s Navy, on 15 August 2006, a North Sea
Fleet submarine flotilla began using a newly researched and developed “special-purpose
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floating raft vehicle for loading mines/torpedoes into submarines” (潜艇装雷浮筏专
用车). This mobile (perhaps towed) platform from which mines can be loaded into
torpedo tubes has significant storage and hoisting capacity. It is credited with improving
loading speed sixfold while improving concealability, perhaps by allowing rendezvous
with a submarine in coastal waters away from a standard pier location.270
Improvised exercises have also been carried out recently by sea-mine depot officers.271
A South Sea Fleet torpedo and sea-mine depot has been tasked with “four transformations” to improve high-speed, long-distance mobile-mine transport.272 An East Sea Fleet
torpedo and sea-mine depot has conducted independent, mobile all-weather exercises
designed to ensure high-speed transport of sea-mine components during air raids. Officers helped to develop appropriate detection systems and testing instruments. They
exploited terrain, weather, and darkness for camouflage.273 A North Sea Fleet logistics
support base has formed a “technical service team” for submarine mines and has mastered “urgent refueling in the field without a dock.”274 On 16 March 2006, “rookies”
(新号手) at a North Sea Fleet torpedo and sea-mine depot conducted “night training in
torpedo and sea mine emergency support” (夜间鱼雷应急保障训练), suggesting that
such emphasis on realistic conditions is normal for this unit. An administrative officer
Photo 7. Mine Depot with Warshot and Training Mines. The bands on the ninety-eight mines
on the left side of the image indicate that they are exercise shapes, and could support a robust
exercise program. The solid colors on the similar number of mines to the right suggest that they
are warshots.
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reports that in late November 2006, the Guangzhou Support Base (South Sea Fleet) provided mobile emergency resupply of mines from a “temporary supply site” (临时补给
阵地) over five hundred kilometers from base.275 The Naval Engineering University has
recently provided significant assistance in improving sea-mine management, technical
support, and spare parts.276
MIW is a major surface fleet mission. The PLAN has stressed speed,277 automation and
electronics,278 and “all-weather” minelaying capabilities.279 Jianghu-class frigates have
conducted minelaying as part of ASW training.280 Captains of minesweepers train at
a special center at Lushun naval base.281 Minesweeping units have recently practiced
laying various types of moored and deep bottom mines as part of fast-paced, confrontational exercises. One South Sea Fleet minesweeping unit has recently participated in
over ten such exercises, in which it “achieved 26 scientific research results” as part of a
larger effort to keep abreast of a “new global revolution in military affairs” that includes
“network-centric training” and “the intelligization of sea mines.”282 Indeed, the PLAN
apparently views minesweepers equipped with “torpedo” (mobile) mines as a viable
ASW platform that illustrates the potential for “old equipment + networks + talent” to
“thoroughly convince” those who believe that “it is not possible to establish a platform
for informatized exercises on old equipment.”283 In 2002, a North Sea Fleet unit including minesweepers 813 and 811 attacked submarines with “both foreign and domestic
torpedo sea mines” with a “100% success rate.”284 More recently, all three of China’s fleets
have trained with what appear to be advanced mobile mines. In December 2005, North
Photo 8. PLAN Minesweepers.
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Sea Fleet sailors were photographed hoisting a “new type of sea mine,” possibly into a
submarine.285 The mine’s similarity to U.S. Mark 25 Mod 2 mines reflects the influence
of U.S. and Russian technology in PLAN mine development.286
There remains substantial room for improvement in Chinese MIW. Malfunctions still
sometimes occur during mine exercises.287 Equipment support materials are sometimes
only available in foreign languages (e.g., Russian) and must be translated or otherwise
analyzed.288 Also, political work still consumes some time, albeit perhaps less than ever
before.289 There is apparently still some resistance to PLAN policies of making exercises
mimic actual combat conditions.290 There is even evidence from MIW exercises that the
PLAN continues to experience challenges in shifting to a modern, professional organization.291 But PLAN leaders clearly understand that hardware advances are incomplete
without related human-capital improvements.292 PLAN officers are determined to
improve MIW capabilities,293 devise new training methods,294 and to practice more flexible sequences.295 At the beginning of 2001, South Sea Fleet minesweeper 814 reformed
its noncommissioned officer preparation by implementing “training for different grades
and levels” to make it commensurate with previous experience and thereby avoid unnecessary repetition.296 Minesweeper 852 introduced competition and examinations to improve crew evaluation.297 At the end of April 2005, a PLAN minesweeper unit practiced
sweeping and laying mines in an “unfamiliar sea area,” under all weather conditions,
with the goal of “training as you will fight.”298
Certain units are hailed for training innovations. A South Sea Fleet minesweeper unit’s
“flagship,” hull 809, was rewarded for achieving repeated PLAN firsts.299 The unit
established a “night training implementation leading small group” to increase the challenges of training. The unit’s officers used Global Positioning System (GPS), radar, and
hand-held location systems (including compasses and sextants) to arrive, in an unfamiliar area, at a point within two meters of the required position.300 Utilization of multiple
navigation systems appears to hedge against any one system’s becoming unusable under
combat conditions. In 2000, in order to prepare for modern high-technology war,
minesweeper 809 established a “warfare and training methods discussion group” that
studied counters for electronic interference, high-performance enemy sea mines, overthe-horizon missile attack, and potential opponents’ concepts, as well as the employment of both deployed and future Chinese equipment. Since 2001, minesweeper 809 has
developed twelve new tactics to “counter-electronically jam” (抗电子干扰) advanced
enemy mines and over-the-horizon missile attack.301 In 2003, People’s Navy reported that
ship 809 had conducted the PLAN’s first MIW exercise (实布实扫水雷) involving opposing forces and had cleared more mines under realistic conditions during peacetime
than any other PLAN ship. By 2003, minesweeper 809 was routinely and successfully
clearing all types of mines in day or night, in all types of weather, and making decisions
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on the spot in a wide variety of uncertain and realistic conditions.302 Similarly advanced,
according to media reports, is minesweeper 804. This ship has exercised with a remotely
Photo 9. PLAN Mine Countermeasures Ship 804. This is one of China’s most modern mine
countermeasures ships. This ship has exercised with a remotely operated mine-hunting underwater unmanned vehicle and using what appear to be sophisticated, high-frequency active digital
sonars.

operated mine-hunting underwater unmanned vehicle, described as a “new type of mine
clearing device” and using what appear to be sophisticated, high-frequency, active digital
sonars.303
PLAN scientists are also evaluating the possibilities for using new simulation systems for
mine warfare exercises.304 In 2006, an East Sea Fleet minesweeping squadron gave monetary incentives to advanced units and individuals who worked hard to become talented
personnel.305 PLAN experts have published numerous academic papers and attended
foreign MCM exercises (e.g., in Singapore, 2007).306
As the above-cited minesweeper operations suggest, effective MIW requires effective
mine countermeasures. China particularly lags behind the West in MCM technology,
although researchers are studying previous Western approaches, including the use of underwater rocket bombs (RBUs).307 The PLAN is aware of this shortcoming and preparing
accordingly.308 While its talented young MCM/MIW officers may not match those of its
submarine force, they too are being nurtured.309 Its detailed arrangements for emergency
contingencies are based on the premise that suffering damage during future wars is
inevitable.310 Perhaps this is why crews train to operate multiple weapons systems, and
for executive officers (XOs) to perform the roles of commanding officers.311 In a 10 April
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2005 North Sea Fleet ASW exercise, for instance, a “sea mine squad” reportedly practiced
launching rockets and depth charges from a “submarine-hunting ship.”312 In recounting a major June 2005 East Sea Fleet minesweeper formation exercise, analysts invoke
China’s Vietnam minesweeping legacy to emphasize that a “minesweeper is regarded
as the ‘dare-to-die corps’ of maritime warfare; its role is vital.”313 Mines are playing an
increasing role in Red-versus-Blue training, a relatively new domain for the PLAN. In
2002, in the South China Sea, an “underwater vanguard boat” confronted ASW ships,
aircraft, and an underwater minefield blockade. It escaped after firing “a new type of
Chinese-manufactured torpedo.”314
Photo 10. Console on Mine Countermeasures Ship. This operator’s console, probably from Mine
Countermeasures Ship 804, features a joystick and the ability to observe camera images remotely. It could be the location from which the mine-hunting UUV previously pictured is operated.

Some exercises have assumed “that ‘enemy vessels’ had mined a certain sea area to block
our warships from passing.”315 MCM and MIW assets seem to be virtually interchangeable, in that PLAN minesweepers regularly practice laying mines.316 Minesweeper ship
training has recently included “daytime deep water minesweeping,” “nighttime minesweeping,” and “passing through a composite minefield” for single ships.317
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A Preliminary Conception of PLAN Mine Warfare Doctrine
Combining the historical development of Chinese mine warfare, its present capabilities,
and the considerable training activities outlined in the preceding section, it is possible
to sketch the broad outlines of contemporary PLAN MIW doctrine. One likely forum
for dissemination of such doctrine is China’s MIW/MCM journal Sea Mine Warfare and
Ship Self-Defense (水雷战与舰船防护).318 The existence of such a professional publication in itself suggests a decisive commitment to this warfare specialty. The doctrinal
outline that follows represents only a preliminary sketch, given the continuing opacity of
all Chinese military programs, including MIW. The following thirteen points are derived
from phrases that appear repeatedly in Chinese MIW writings, where they are treated as
having major strategic and tactical significance.319
1. “易布难扫” (Easy to Lay, Hard to Sweep). This simple formulation of the advantages
of offensive mining is used universally in PRC writings on mine warfare. It reflects a
strong conviction, based on historical analyses and trends in naval warfare, that MIW
possibilities have significantly outpaced MCM development and will continue to do
so.320 This is a core motivating principle for Chinese MIW, but it is also built on specific
assessments that mine countermeasures represent a critical vulnerability of the U.S.
Navy. However technically superior the U.S. Navy may be in MCM to the PLAN, the
basic calculus that MCM will remain arduous and resource-intensive for all navies does
not change.
2. “不惹人注意” (Not Attracting Attention). MIW and MCM are among the least glorious components of modern naval warfare. Dropping a mine overboard hardly creates
the same exhilaration as launching in a fighter from an aircraft carrier. Moreover, the
platforms involved generally do not inspire admirers of great ships. In navies around the
world, mine warfare is a less favored career route than others. In addition, these weapons
are fundamentally difficult to monitor with any confidence, since they are very easily
hidden. Chinese naval strategists are aware of these peculiarities and are keen to use the
mundane aspects of MIW to their advantage—betting that their own robust offensive
capabilities will not be countered and therefore can be exploited in the event of war.321
Finally, unlike the development of aircraft carriers, to give the most obvious contrast,
advances in sea mines will not conflict with China’s professed strategy of “peaceful development” or trigger arms races with potential adversaries, such as Japan.
3. “四两可拨千斤” (Four Ounces Can Move One Thousand Pounds). The asymmetric
nature of mine warfare is reflected in this expression, common to many Chinese MIW
analyses.322 The aphorism also suggests, however, that MIW is capable of inducing major
strategic effects well beyond actual combat losses inflicted on the adversary.323 One
Chinese naval analyst contends that MIW imposes “huge psychological pressure” on

42

china maritime studies

the enemy.324 This conclusion echoes notions in the U.S. Navy: “[Mines are such] highly
effective psychological weapons [that the] mere suspicion that they might be present is
usually sufficient cause to shut down a port or shipping channel, disrupt battle plans,
and force the re-routing of personnel, weapons, and supplies.”325 Consistent with this
approach, Science of Campaigns discusses the employment of “decoy minelaying” for the
purpose of confusing the enemy and causing him to waste limited MCM resources.326
4. “控在一定时间一定海区” (Sea Control at a Specific Time in a Specific Sea Area).
PLAN leaders recognize that they cannot challenge the U.S. Navy symmetrically for
absolute sea control. A 2005 article in China Military Science by a scholar from Nanjing
Naval Command and Staff College outlines a Chinese notion of “sea control” that is
described as distinct from the American conception: “For military circles in China, command of the sea means one side in a conflict having control over a specific sea area for
a specific period of time.”327 The U.S. Navy is said to seek total mastery of the seas; the
PLAN conception is much narrower. MIW could logically play a decisive role in such a
strategy, given its strong potential for impeding the adversary’s momentum and also for
channeling the adversary into selected sea areas.
5.巨大数量 (Huge Numbers). Vast quantities of sea mines offer the PLAN a variety of
operational possibilities, particularly given the important psychological effects of even
comparatively obsolete sea mines under the right circumstances. Persian Gulf War analyses by PLAN strategists cited above suggest a clear realization that relatively low numbers
of laid mines (1,100) inhibited Iraqi MIW.328 Recall that the same analyses call for developing methods for “high-volume carriers for mines.”329 Moreover, we have cited above a
Chinese report discussing submarine mine belts.330 A Chinese analysis of the U.S. mine
blockade of Japan in 1945 concludes that the “high number of mines” was a critical
factor.331 Estimates of the number of mines currently required to blockade Taiwan vary
between seven and fourteen thousand,332 which amounts to a relatively small proportion
of available estimates of PLAN aggregate sea-mine stocks. Science of Campaigns emphasizes the importance of having sufficient numbers of mines so that a specified number
can be held in reserve to replenish minefields during the course of a “joint blockade
campaign.”333
6. “先制” (First Control). The concept of “first strike,” which permeates PLA doctrine, is
especially relevant to mine warfare. This phrase, which appears often in Chinese writings concerning MIW, suggests a strong preemptive tendency. Surreptitiously laying sea
mines might give the advantage of surprise. According to an article in Naval and Merchant Ships, “mines have become an important component of the ‘first to control’
. . . combat operations.”334 Another article from the same periodical observes that “refitted civilian ships are particularly suited for offensive mine-laying operations before the
enemy has figured out one’s strategic intentions.”335 PRC MIW expert Fu Jinzhu alludes

chinese mine warfare

43

starkly to the preemption issue when, in an appraisal of Taiwan MIW, he asserts, “Since
Taiwan’s minelaying capability is already known, it ought to be easily removed.”336 Yet
another article in Naval and Merchant Ships, from 2005, hints even more directly at
preemption: “If minelaying cannot be done rapidly, it will probably be impossible to accomplish MIW missions before the outbreak of war.”337
7.高低技术 (High and Low Technology). PLAN writings commonly cite the cost-effective
nature of MIW. A typical graphic, from a 2004 Naval and Merchant Ships article, juxtaposes the costs of Iraqi mines in the Persian Gulf War, $1,500–$10,000, with the costs to
repair U.S. Navy ships damaged by them, which ranged as high as ninety-six million dollars.338 Nevertheless, it is also important to recall the mid-2004 statement from People’s
Navy that “China is not Iraq. . . . It has advanced sea mines.”339 As already noted, China
has acquired and now produces some of the world’s most advanced and lethal mines.
Used in combination, high- and low-technology MIW will make the MCM challenge
that much more complicated and difficult for any prospective opponent.340 The PLAN
seeks to maximize its MIW capabilities through fuse retrofits and prioritization of the
most advanced mines for the most challenging missions.
8.潜载雷为隐蔽, 空载雷为多快 (Submarine Delivery for Concealment, Air Delivery
for Speed and Quantity). Chinese strategists have carefully considered the comparative
advantages of various laying platforms. Their analyses of Iraqi MIW in the Gulf War
emphasize the extensive vulnerability of surface ships engaged in minelaying.341 Submarine delivery is viewed as ideal for mine strikes against hard targets, such as ports and
bases, because of the unparalleled stealth qualities of submarines.342 “The submarine’s
most notable characteristic is its high degree of stealth, which assures that [submarinelaid] minefields remain far more dangerous to the enemy than [fields] sown by aircraft
or surface vessels.”343 The preceding section of this study suggests a high level of training
activity focusing on submarine MIW operations. While submarines can deliver mines
with great precision, however, their load-outs are not very large, and their sortie rates
are low. Aircraft, by contrast, can deliver mines with much greater speed and efficiency,
potentially also reaching waters too shallow for submarines.344 Chinese analysts also
understand the factors that influence the efficacy of laying particular types of mines
in particular locations.345 Dalian Naval Academy experts cite such factors as “water
depth, seabed geology, seabed form, tide, current, wind, wave, degree of transparency of
seawater, temperature of seawater, salinity of seawater, ocean organisms, various noises,
earthquakes, [and] magnetic storms.”�346
9.军民联合 (Civil-Military Integration). PRC historical analyses point to numerous examples, ranging from World War II to the Persian Gulf War, of civilian vessels executing
MIW and MCM missions during wartime. Chinese analysts additionally point out that
civilian vessels actually cleared mines from waterways during the Chinese civil war.347
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According to a 2004 article in Modern Navy: “Organizing quick and effective civilian
ship participation in warfare is an important guarantor of victory in naval warfare.” It
continues, “China’s coastal [civilian] ships are now an abundant resource . . . [and thus
constitute] a huge maritime war force.” Finally, it is argued that MIW/MCM missions
should receive first priority when making modifications to upgrade civilian ships for
combat.348 Exercise activity noted in the preceding section suggests that these ideas are
not simply theoretical. Moreover, civil-military integration for MIW/MCM is consistent
with China’s strategic culture.349
10. “水下卫士” (Undersea Sentry). Although U.S. aircraft carriers are taken seriously
in China,350 there is evidence that PLAN strategists are equally or more concerned with
U.S. SSNs.351 Whereas PLAN submarines might not fare well in head-to-head combat
with U.S. Navy submarines, MIW is viewed as potentially effective for coping with this
threat.352 Even Navy Militia minelaying is viewed in this context, albeit likely in coastal
waters.353 Chinese analysts note that the Soviets revived mine warfare during the late
Cold War in part to counter American SSNs. Indeed, one Chinese survey of ASW explains how new mines emerged in the 1980s “that are more appropriate to the requirements of modern anti-submarine warfare.”354 A detailed Chinese analysis of Russian
rocket mines concludes, “These weapons will attack SSNs too rapidly for countermeasures to engage, and are also rated to be highly effective against the mono-hull construction of U.S. submarines.”355 Chinese strategists note that “submarines are acutely
vulnerable to mines, because passive sonar is not likely to be effective in locating mines,
and because submarines have very limited organic MCM capabilities.”356 Moreover, the
surprise nature of the mining threat is likely to reduce the efficacy of the submarine’s
countermeasures.357 ASW is repeatedly emphasized as a mission in a Chinese textbook
on mine warfare published in 2007358 and already practiced in Red-versus-Blue confrontational exercises.359 Campaign Theory Study Guide calls explicitly for the formation of
“anti-submarine mine zones.”360 In so doing, China could draw on advanced Russian
mines, such as the PMK-2, specifically designed to target U.S. submarines, as well as
indigenous variants. Sea mines, therefore, potentially give the PLAN affordable “poor
man’s” ASW capabilities that it could not otherwise obtain, providing a stopgap measure
until Beijing can put a more robust ASW posture into place. U.S. submarines are highly
survivable, but adversary war planners may consider a “mission-kill” damaged submarine equivalent to a destroyed one.361
11. “水雷管理的信息化” (Mine Management “Informatization”). The integration of
information technology has become a major goal of contemporary Chinese military
reforms, and this goal also applies to mine warfare.362 The implications for logistics
management practices, a priority for the PLA since the Korean War, are particularly
salient. Chinese naval analysts emphasize the importance of transporting large quantities
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of different types of mines efficiently.363 Additional reports suggest that the PLAN
takes MIW logistics seriously—for example, revamping depot leadership,364 improving
information flow365 and logistics management,366 regularly culling obsolete weapons
from the sea-mine inventory,367 and training officers and enlisted in technical checks and
deployment preparation.368 Recognizing the vital role of logistics in MIW, in March 1994
the Navy Logistics Department’s “Navy Rear Services Depot Vocational Administration
Regulations” stipulated high-level training for cadres and soldiers specializing in seaPhoto 11. Exploiting Information Technology. Chinese technicians use a computer, with an exercise mine in the immediate background. Computers could greatly increase the accuracy of mine
allocation, placement, and feature settings (such as activation delay, ship counters, and other
variables), thereby optimizing their effectiveness.

mine technology in all aspects of their work, including monitoring inventories, repairing, and discarding obsolete weapons.369 The PLAN Ordnance Support Department has
issued and implemented further regulations such that “the time to rotate from one mine
war-readiness level to another has been reduced.”370 As of 2008, for one South Sea Fleet
sea mine depot
to know exactly the inventory in the depot is no longer enough for the electronic “housekeepers,” they should also be good at designing well-conceived and detailed support plans
under various complicated conditions. In fact, the support plans automatically produced
by the system are so precise that they can not only show the specific model of any piece of
ordnance, but can also tell the environment, weather, current and tide of the waters where
support is needed.371
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A Qingdao Logistics base reportedly has drawn on “good working relationships with
about 20 schools inside and outside of the military, about 30 research organizations
inside and outside of the military, and about 40 equipment production factories” to
make great progress in solving practical problems associated with developing and
maintaining equipment appropriate to support realistic training under informatized
conditions. A resulting “‘Automatic Mine Checking System’ and ‘Navy Ship Equipment Automatic Maintenance and Repair System’ . . . earned military-wide first- and
second-class awards for rear services equipment technological advances.”372 The PLAN
has also developed a “simulation training system for mine clearance craft.”373 A plethora
of articles in the Chinese journal Sea Mine Warfare and Ship Self-Defense demonstrate
the strong Chinese conviction that mine warfare cannot be effective without weapons
that work reliably.374
12.布扫雷互相支持 (MIW/MCM Mutual Support). Chinese naval strategists are
cognizant of China’s traditional weakness in MCM and of resulting vulnerabilities. It
is observed that “it will be extremely easy for an enemy to sow large numbers of mines
among the many islands and numerous harbors . . . along China’s southeast coast.”375
Chinese MCM will not reach the technological level of Western MCM in the near
future. Although new platforms and technologies are now entering China’s inventory
of MCM capabilities, the basic approach is likely to remain different from that of the
West.376 Nevertheless, the exercise activity noted in the preceding section does suggest
a reinvigorated commitment to MCM, as do the several new-type minesweepers that
have entered the PLA Navy in the last few years (see above). Moreover, a major research
effort in MCM seems to be under way.377 This research includes advanced methods,
such as employment of helicopters for MCM,378 and UUVs.379 Science of Campaigns
observes that Chinese naval bases are likely to be targets of adversary mine warfare.380
There also seems to be a fundamental conviction that a synergistic relationship exists
between MCM and MIW—that China’s mine countermeasures will fundamentally
support robust mine warfare. One People’s Navy article endorsed this and related capabilities as vital “sharp double-edged swords.”381 Indeed, to support minesweeping and
minelaying exercises during March–September 2005, the PLAN “organized systematic
training, observation, and exchanges with regard to the entire processes of ships’ operations of sweeping and hunting for mines.”382 Reflecting their importance in Chinese
mine warfare, civilian vessels are also participating in MCM exercises.383
13.卫星航海 (Satellite Navigation). Knowing the precise location of mines is vital for
creating and maintaining safe passages through or around minefields and for future
clearing or reseeding efforts. A significant problem in past MIW campaigns has been
that of friendly-fire casualties. Communications and navigation errors in wartime have
frequently led MIW practitioners to destroy their own ships.384 It is worth considering
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Photo 12. Minesweeping Exercise. Crewmembers on a PLAN East Sea Fleet mine countermeasures ship handle a towed noisemaker used to sweep acoustically triggered mines in May 2008.
Already in the water is a marking buoy. Mine rails are visible on the deck to the right of the
crane.

how the advent of GPS technologies could enhance the future effectiveness of MIW if
this technology enables much more accurate laying of fields (or MIW operations by
less experienced cadres), as well as the transmission of information on the parameters
of those fields to friendly units.385 Mentions of GPS-related training activities in PLAN
reports, including MIW and MCM exercises at night and in bad weather, may indicate
that this new technology could become a significant MIW enabler.386 This may also be
suggested by a minesweeper unit’s development of a “recording instrument” that “raises
the accuracy and battle operations capacity of sea mine sweeping and laying.”387

Threat and Response? Trends in Western Pacific Mine Countermeasures
This study has focused on the capabilities, training, and doctrine of Chinese mine warfare. However, sound strategic analysis must also examine the forces on the other side of
the ledger—namely the mine countermeasures forces that may be tasked with countering the Chinese MIW threat.
At present, the prospects for American MCM forces rapidly countering Chinese MIW
are not promising. The majority of U.S. Navy MCM assets are currently far from the
fight. The nearest effective such units are two (soon to be four) minesweepers in Sasebo,
Japan. They are only a day and a half from Taiwan. But even their arrival would not
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appreciably alter a worrisome situation. The bulk of U.S. mine-hunting assets are based
in San Diego, California, having recently moved from Texas.388 In addition, helicopter
MCM assets that could reach the theater faster would face severe threats if they attempted to operate in contested airspace.389 Campaign Theory Study Guide, for instance, calls
on campaign commanders to “organize maritime and air mobile strength and island and
coastal firepower to initiate multi-round, multi-directional attack in order to resolutely
shatter the enemy’s mine sweeping and barrier clearing attempt.”390
To be sure, the U.S. Navy is currently in the midst of one of the most radical transitions in the history of its MCM programs. This transformation will, over the next
decade, involve the decommissioning of all specialized U.S. Navy MCM vessels and
their replacement by the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). This ship is designed to enhance
efficiency through “modular” engineering—the ability to accept different modules for
different mission packages. The LCS type—the first unit, USS Freedom (LCS 1), was
commissioned in November 2008—possesses improved “organic” mine locating and
neutralization capabilities, including advanced sonar systems and unmanned underwater and -surface vehicles, which perform mine-locating missions. LCS carries MH-60S
helicopters equipped with the Airborne Laser Mine Detection System to discover mines.
It would destroy any mines so detected with either supercavitating projectiles fired from
a specialized helicopter-mounted machine gun or with a fiber optic–guided, expendable, explosive UUV.391 Other surface vessels and submarines will also be given enhanced
sonar systems that will allow them to detect and avoid mines more effectively.
These changes constitute a shift from dedicated MCM vessels to “organic” mine countermeasures, a transition designed to address major trends in the field. The most traditional
form of MCM is the use of simple devices to sever anchor chains on moored mines. Bottom mines, however, require a more advanced method, mimicking the triggering signals
that passing ships create. Thus, helicopters tow sleds, and minesweepers tow drogues,
which create magnetic and acoustic signals that satisfy detonation criteria, causing the
mines to explode harmlessly. But, as mentioned previously, this mine-removal method
is becoming less viable as the logic circuitry and software of bottom mines become
increasingly sophisticated and harder to deceive. The current practice, therefore, is to
search for bottom mines via high-resolution sonar and then destroy them with explosive charges. This method, known as “mine hunting,” is a time-consuming and arduous process, requiring not only extremely accurate bathymetric mapping but also the
painstaking investigation of every minelike object on the seabed in the area of concern.
This requires advanced, expensive technology, specialized training, and high levels of
localization accuracy.392
The U.S. Navy is on track to fund up to seven LCSs through fiscal year 2010, toward an
eventual total of fifty-five vessels,393 a plan strongly endorsed by Secretary of Defense
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Robert Gates.394 On the face of it, the commitment to LCS can be viewed as a strong
commitment to MCM. After all, LCS will incorporate the most advanced MCM technology available, and the number of ships eventually deployed should exceed the current
dedicated MCM inventory. The concept of LCS, moreover, as a relatively inexpensive
ship built to venture into the shallows for high-intensity combat, is generally conducive
to the mine countermeasures mission.395 However, the experimental nature of LCS, and
indeed the entire “modular” enterprise, brings a degree of risk in terms of crew proficiency and training, as well as the serviceability of the ship and its modules. Unfortunately, even if this transition reaches its optimal projected efficiency, the U.S. Navy will
still be hard pressed to counter effectively the threat outlined in this study. Projected LCS
numbers would certainly be adequate for another Desert Storm, and even for opening
the Strait of Hormuz in the event of a major conflict with Iran. But this projected order
of battle will fall well short of what is required to combat the PLAN’s hundreds, potentially even thousands, of delivery platforms for its large stockpile of mines. A credible
response might entail increasing the LCS outlay significantly, producing a force prepared
to accept significant attrition in paving the way for strike groups into potentially heavily
mined western Pacific zones. Given current financial constraints, however, such a force is
unlikely to materialize.
Taiwan’s prospects for countering Chinese MIW are even more bleak, as its MCM forces
are weak and extremely vulnerable to air and missile strikes. In contrast to Republic of
China Air Force (ROCAF) aircraft, which are protected by revetments (though the runways from which they operate could easily be rendered unusable), Taiwan MCM forces
are exposed and would likely be PLA priority targets. Taiwan possesses just a dozen
mine warfare vessels. Four of these are the refurbished Yung Yang–class minesweepers,
originally built in the United States in the mid-1950s. A Chinese source assesses these
four ships as having “a definite detection capability for magnetic, magnetic influence,
acoustic, and other detonators on conventional sea mines. These vessels’ USQS-1 sonar
. . . has the capability to detect moored mines, but cannot detect [bottom] mines.” 396
Taiwan’s order of battle also includes four smaller, but more modern, German-built
MWV 50 (Yung Fung) mine hunters.397 The same Chinese source claims that these vessels’ mine-hunting sonar has not performed well but notes that their remotely operated
explosive-emplacing mine-neutralization equipment has some significant capability.398
Finally, Taiwan has four old U.S.-built Adjutant-class minesweepers that Jane’s assessed
in 1996 as having “more or less come to the end of their useful lives.”399
In short, Taiwan has, at most, eight minesweepers that could attempt to counter Chinese
mines. It is quite possible that none of these vessels are adept at actuating bottom mines,
particularly those with modern fuses. Taiwan’s ability to create safe passages through
minefields, consequently, is very much in doubt. One assessment published in a PRC
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journal concludes that if Taiwan MCM forces were sent into battle, it would be a case of
“pulling one’s jacket off to reveal one’s raggedness.” This same analysis also observes that
“if the Taiwan Navy loses command of the air and sea, then using aircraft or warships
to sow mines becomes impossible” and would thereby cause its “fishing vessels . . . [to]
commit suicide in the process of [trying to] lay defensive minefields.” The analysis adds
that Taiwan’s navy “has no way to clear the specialized mines that might be part of an
eastern coast blockade.”400
These limitations in the combined ability of the United States and Taiwan to respond
would doubtlessly prompt Washington and Taipei to seek other allies that could contribute to the effort. An obvious source for assistance would be Japan, with its twenty-six
MCM vessels—it is illustrative of Tokyo’s strong commitment to MCM that all these
craft are of 1980s or newer vintage.401 The February 2005 joint declaration by the United
States and Japan that “encourag[ing] the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the
Taiwan Strait through dialogue” is a “common strategic objective” offers some reason
to believe that Tokyo might consider limited military support, such as mine clearing, in
certain scenarios.402 However, growing economic interdependence between Japan and
China, the enduring pacifist undertones in Japanese politics (and the attendant inexperience of Japanese leaders in handling military-political crises), not to mention China’s
potential for retaliation (perhaps including the use of sea mines), all militate against
bold action by Japan to counter Chinese mine warfare. Nevertheless, it is clear that Chinese naval strategists appreciate the important place of Japan in the overall Pacific MIW
balance. A recent issue of Naval and Merchant Ships, for example, carried a nine-page
spread devoted solely to analyzing Japanese MCM developments. 403
It is also worth noting that PRC researchers intensively monitor U.S. Navy404 and other
Western405 MCM trends and capabilities. PLAN researchers strive to understand research
projects under way at the most advanced U.S. research institutes, such as the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Rhode Island.406 Chinese analysts are closely watching the U.S.
Navy transition from specialized to organic MCM platforms and are probing for resulting strategic vulnerabilities.407 Chinese researchers are following various overseas UUV
designs and developments closely.408 They are particularly interested in combat capabilities for UUVs—for example, the ability to deploy for long periods near enemy harbors
to perform reconnaissance and possibly engage targets.409 They are acutely aware that
helicopter MCM is central to U.S. doctrine, and they follow minutely the details of the
development and testing of new systems.410 They are also very interested in the capabilities of Virginia-class submarines, especially their mine countermeasures.411
Having analyzed the prospects for direct counters to the PLAN’s MIW development, it is
possible to evaluate the strategic significance of Chinese MIW.
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Scenarios
For that purpose, we now turn to examining the roles that Chinese MIW could assume
within the most important scenarios for conflict in East Asia. Naturally, there is a tendency to focus on the Taiwan issue in this regard. However, analysts of Chinese defense
policy must grapple with a variety of plausible scenarios, in view of Beijing’s growing
geostrategic weight in the maritime domain.
Little attention is paid to the maritime dimensions of China’s potential role in a future
conflict on the Korean Peninsula. However, given Korea’s proximity to North China,
such a conflict would impinge directly upon China’s security interests. If Beijing looks to
signal its equities in the early stages of a developing crisis without immediately resorting to the large-scale use of force, mine warfare might logically suit its purposes.412 The
PLAN could lay minimal minefields extending from the tip of the Shandong Peninsula
toward North Korea’s southwestern islands, not far from the thirty-eighth parallel.413 A
slightly more ambitious campaign, but nevertheless within PLAN capability, would be to
lay mines in patterns extending directly eastward from Qingdao, one of China’s largest
naval bases, toward the South Korean coast. Either step could signal, with some subtlety,
a determination to protect Pyongyang, and either would not only severely constrain U.S.
Navy operations in the Yellow Sea but put considerable pressure on Seoul. Shallow water
depths throughout this area underline the comparative simplicity of such campaigns.
A second set of scenarios to consider encompasses China’s strategic interactions with
Southeast Asia, particularly nations bordering the South China Sea. Here again, diplomatic tendencies are at present strongly positive, but the potential for conflict remains.
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia all rely heavily on seaborne trade
through shallow waters and constricted passages. All these countries, therefore, would be
vulnerable to PRC mining, whatever the specific scenario.414 Indeed, Science of Campaigns envisions the use of sea mines in the context of “Offensive Operations against
Coral Reef Islands.”415 In a conflict over the Spratly Islands, Beijing could choose to
reinforce its claims to specific islands with carefully limited minefields as an alternative
to a prolonged, expensive, and potentially more provocative surface warship presence.
Of all the states of Southeast Asia, Vietnam is plainly most susceptible to pressure from
Chinese MIW.416
A third and more likely set of scenarios concerns conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.
Although cross-strait relations have improved impressively since March 2008 with new
leadership in Taipei, conflict in this delicate relationship cannot, unfortunately, be ruled
out for the foreseeable future. To understand the possible role of Chinese mine warfare
in these scenarios, it is useful to consider “minimal” and “maximal” alternatives. There
are a variety of political and strategic reasons why Beijing might opt to minimize the
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military aspects. Foremost among them would be the desire to limit casualties and
physical damage to Taiwan, so as not to stiffen the islanders’ resistance. In this respect,
MIW could be much more useful than a large missile barrage, which could very well kill
many Taiwanese. The “grey zone” of hostile actions without major casualties—and thus
no catalyzing casus belli to energize public opinion—would likely place Washington
(and perhaps Tokyo) on the horns of a dilemma regarding intervention.
In this scenario, the major targets would be Taiwan’s ports, most of which are highly
susceptible to mining, given the shallow waters that surround most of Taiwan.417 Major
combat would be largely restricted to the suppression of Taiwan’s navy and air force.
Campaign Theory Study Guide states that Taiwan’s military envisions the following scenario: “Naval and air blockade will be the inevitable combat phase, and using sea mines
to combat the blockade will be the most cost efficient method. Within 4–6 days in the
first phase, Taiwan will face a blockade of 5,000–7,000 sea mines; in the second phase,
7,000 more sea mines will be added to the blockade; the two phases will employ less than
15,000 sea mines, enough to cut off Taiwan’s domestic and international sea transportation and supply routes.”418 Over approximately two days, the ports of Kaohsiung, Keelung, Taichung, and Hualian could be systematically closed off by air-dropped mines.419
A Taiwan analyst has concluded that “it is possible to blockade a naval base or a medium-sized harbor by laying 100 aerial non-contact underwater mines, with the cost being
equivalent to that of one anti-ship missile.”420 Simultaneously, or even to a limited extent
beforehand, using mines with time-delayed activation, China’s submarines, surface warships, and converted civilian merchant vessels could sow the waters adjacent to Taiwan
with a variety of mines. In this scenario, the PLAN could reserve its most advanced
platforms and rocket rising mines for Taiwan’s eastern ports. Simultaneously, Beijing
would warn outside powers to stay away, claiming that the waters east of Taiwan—a logical place for the United States and its allies to amass naval forces—had been “intensively
mined,” with drifting mines, and perhaps, again, with rocket rising mines. Given the fissures already present in Taiwan’s society, the vulnerability of its economy to a blockade,
and the likely sophistication and flexibility of PRC political goals (e.g., no forces from
the mainland need be based on Taiwan), this scenario would have a reasonable chance
of success. A combination of factors could make it attractive to Beijing, including the
great physical distance involved, the irreducibly time-intensive nature of mine-clearing
operations,421 the likely sophistication of Chinese mines, the possibility that China would
be able to reseed minefields, and the limited U.S. MCM forces available.
Major drawbacks of the above scenario from Beijing’s perspective are that it not only
depends on a rapid collapse of will in Taipei but would give the United States and its
allies a chance to seize the initiative after the PLA’s opening moves. A “maximal” PLA
strategy—an amphibious invasion, with aggressive and wide-ranging preemptive strikes
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against U.S. (and possibly Japanese) forces—would, on the other hand, preclude these
possibilities, perhaps by decapitating Taiwan’s leadership before the assault.
If Beijing determined that Washington would indeed intervene on Taiwan’s behalf, it
might also strike out aggressively against U.S. forces in the Pacific. Options available
could include the mining via submarine of waters off U.S. bases in Okinawa, other
parts of Japan, Guam, and even perhaps Hawaii. One Chinese study on ASW suggests
that mine warfare against adversary submarines is best conducted by laying “mines in
the egress routes proximate to the enemy’s bases . . . thus limiting the ability of enemy
submarines to get out to the ocean.”422 Such ranges are well within the endurance limits
of PLAN submarines, which could mine the necessary channels with mobile mines,
provided that they were able to reach them undetected.423 With regard to long-distance
offensive MIW operations, it is perhaps noteworthy that Chinese naval analysts have
evaluated the “success” of German submarine mining efforts along the American coast
during World War II. The waters around Japan’s southern Ryukyus are also susceptible
to Chinese offensive mining operations. Another article suggests: “On the basis of a
great quantity of research, the PLA believes that U.S. nuclear submarines are very quiet,
[are] difficult to . . . counterattack . . . [and] must [be] restrained.”424 According to that
analysis, this concern has been a major impetus for Chinese research on mobile mines;
while mining operations in the vicinity of Guam are also suggested, the priority would
be laying “[mobile] sea mines in each channel of the Pacific [Ocean’s] First Island Chain,
thereby forming together [a] blockade line [and] preventing U.S. nuclear submarines
from entering China’s nearby sea areas.”425
Chinese researchers have also looked specifically at how mines might be used to support amphibious operations,426 as well as how to counter adversary use of antilanding
mines.427 According to the Science of Campaigns, MCM operations are a vital component
of the envisioned amphibious campaign.428 Like the waters to the west, north, and south
of Taiwan, those around the southern Ryukyus are susceptible to PRC offensive mining.429 Mining these waters could keep U.S. surface warships and fast attack submarines
in the deeper water east of Taiwan, where China could in turn concentrate its more
capable weapons systems, including advanced diesel submarines. PLA analysts apparently contemplate using naval mines to establish such a sanctuary inside the First Island
Chain, where PLAN ships and submarines could operate without fear of U.S. submarine
attack.430 Therefore, the focus of MIW in the second (maximal) scenario would be on
interdicting opposing naval forces, whereas the emphasis in the first (minimal) scenario
would be on closing Taiwan’s ports.
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Evaluating an Alternative View
Works examining the specific role of Chinese MIW within East Asian conflict scenarios
are rare, so it is worth reflecting on one, published by Michael Glosny in the spring
2004 issue of International Security (hereafter IS), which comes to dramatically different conclusions than does this study. Glosny’s study is profoundly useful, because it
highlights the importance of undersea warfare within Taiwan Strait scenarios. It is also
laudable for bringing rigorous methodological tools to bear on these complex questions.
Unfortunately, however, its analysis, which concludes that the blockade threat to Taiwan
is “overstated,” is based on questionable assumptions that are by now clearly outdated.
Most important, the 2004 IS study vastly underestimates the volume and rapidity of a
Chinese MIW campaign. Its author does this by assuming away most of China’s available
MIW platforms, leaving only a certain percentage of East Sea Fleet submarines. China’s
vast air forces (PLA Navy aviation forces and the PLA Air Force itself) are said to be irrelevant, because they cannot achieve “air dominance.”431 Likewise, PLAN surface assets
are removed from the MIW equation, because “they would be very vulnerable to attack
without air dominance.” China’s vast merchant marine and fishing fleets are not factored
in, because “they would have trouble laying advanced mines, and it would be extremely
complicated [to employ merchant ships for MIW].” Having narrowed the field of minedelivering assets from thousands of candidate platforms to fewer than one hundred
PLAN submarines, the IS author then reduces that number further, suggesting that only
East Sea Fleet vessels could be involved (and not those from the other two major fleets),
and finally trims this number again to reflect the customary readiness rates of various
submarine fleets. In the end, he concludes that over a six-month period the PLAN could
lay a maximum of 1,768 mines, more likely between 858 and 1,248 mines.432 That these
numbers are similar to the approximately one thousand that Iraq laid in the 1991 Gulf
War and considerably less than the roughly three thousand figure North Korea achieved
at Wonsan, both in far more asymmetric contexts, suggests that estimates in the 2004
IS study are well off the mark. As the present study amply demonstrates, Chinese MIW
is robust and would not resemble either Iraqi or North Korean efforts in its scope or
breadth.
Indeed, the conclusions of the 2004 IS study collapse when the air-dominance assumption is questioned. We contend that the PLA could destroy or render unusable the entire
Taiwan air force within a number of days, if not hours.433 Even making “heroic assumptions” about the survival of the ROCAF, it is well within the realm of possibility that
the PLA Navy’s aviation forces (and the PLAAF) would fly mine warfare missions in
contested airspace, accepting a certain level of loss to hostile fire.434 This study presents
considerable evidence that the PRC is serious about mobilizing civilian craft for MIW.
The assertion in the 2004 IS study that such an operation would be “complicated,”
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though logical in theory, ignores the reality that Chinese planners have been considering
this scenario for nearly six decades. Compared to challenges faced by the U.S. military,
which simultaneously runs complex operations in almost every corner of the globe, the
problem of equipping and organizing a large armada of civilian ships for MIW in close
proximity to the Chinese coast is relatively simple, especially given the advent of GPS
and related navigation technologies. Finally, we envision comprehensive involvement by
each of the PLAN’s fleets (and indeed the PLAAF as well) in a Taiwan scenario.
Other major flaws in the 2004 IS study concern Taiwan’s ability to resist a Chinese MIW
campaign. Contrary to conventional wisdom that merchant shipping to Taiwan would
be halted by the simple announcement of a PRC blockade, its author presents historical data to argue that “shipping companies in wartime made huge profits by entering dangerous areas. . . . Merchant shippers continued to sail.” However, the historical
examples presented (Croatia, Lebanon, and the Iran-Iraq War) hardly approximate
the lethal combat environment that would likely accompany a Chinese blockade of
Taiwan.435 If the world wars are better guides in this respect, the author of the 2004 IS
study badly misunderstands the motives of merchant mariners and shippers.436 Some
shippers, driven by profit, might persuade their skippers to slip vessels through a PRC
blockade, but the notion that merchant shipping will continue at the peacetime rate is
unsound. Another problem with the quantitative models presented in the 2004 IS study
is that they do not factor in attrition to Taiwan’s mine countermeasures (or antisubmarine) capabilities. It is patently clear that the very ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and
other precision weapons that make the ROCAF’s survival dubious portend the same for
Taiwan’s naval forces, especially under condition of surprise attack—for which the latter
appear to be much less well prepared than is the ROCAF. A final problem with the 2004
IS study is its appraisal of Taiwan’s will to fight, comparing it at various points to that of
Britain or Germany during the world wars.437 Even if Taipei does have some trappings
of statehood, neither Britain nor Germany had an officer corps that was openly sympathetic to some of the adversary’s goals—a bizarre situation that the author of the 2004 IS
study recognizes.438
Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of the 2004 IS study is that it is restricted to a
China-Taiwan conflict, with no assessment of military involvement by either the United
States or any allies. Although not stated directly by its author, the implication seems
to be that if Taiwan is capable of coping with the MIW (and submarine) threats posed
by the PRC, the U.S. Navy can defeat the Chinese MIW challenge easily. In fact, as the
present study demonstrates at length, Chinese MIW is substantially geared toward major
combat against a superior opponent—that is, the U.S. Navy and allied forces. There is no
sense in obscuring this clear and present danger.
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Policy Implications
This study elucidates a little-known aspect of Chinese naval development. It reveals that
Chinese MIW represents a dynamic and ambitious sector within a PLAN that is plainly
making rapid strides toward modernization.439 It demonstrates that China’s MIW draws
extensively on the assimilated lessons of foreign experiences, as well as a surprisingly rich
and relevant indigenous history.
China’s mine inventory is not only extensive but likely contains some of the world’s
most lethal MIW systems. Indeed, China is on the cutting edge of mine warfare technology and concept development, and it already fields systems that advanced nations—the
United States, for one—do not have in their arsenals. PLA strategists understand the
human dimension of modern warfare, and this is evident in Chinese MIW. Indeed, Chinese naval periodicals reveal an increasingly impressive training regimen, one that goes
beyond rote, scripted exercises. The present study points to a preliminary outline of a
Chinese MIW doctrine that emphasizes speed, psychology, obfuscation, a mix of old and
new technologies, a variety of deployment methods—and that additionally targets very
specific U.S. Navy platforms and doctrines.
Beijing’s military modernization program is a comprehensive effort, striking in both
breadth and focus. Chinese MIW is noteworthy because it is one of a few warfare areas
that could, in conjunction with other capabilities, suddenly and completely upset the
balance of power in the western Pacific. Taiwan’s MCM force is minimal and could be
destroyed in preemptive strikes. Japan’s MCM fleet is robust, but Tokyo remains a major
“wild card” politically in a cross-strait conflict. Most fundamentally, U.S. and allied
MCM forces are not sized or configured to “fight their way in” by operating in areas in
which sea and air control are contested. Even in uncontested waters, MCM forces make
operationally significant changes only slowly. Accordingly, Chinese MIW represents a
point of major leverage for Beijing, wherein the asymmetry between Chinese offensive
and U.S. defensive capability appears to be greater than in nearly any other warfare area,
even antiship cruise missiles, submarines, and information warfare.
Given this significant challenge to U.S. maritime power, the following recommendations
are offered for Navy and national policy makers:
•• At a tactical level, all U.S. Navy warships should be fully prepared to operate effectively in waters that might be mined. The Navy’s ongoing shift from dedicated MCM
forces to organic capability residing in each warship indicates that this requirement
has been recognized. This is particularly important for the submarine force, as fast
attack submarines would doubtless be the first in the fight. There is strong evidence
that the PRC is pursuing ASW primarily through the strategy of deploying advanced,
deepwater mines. But rapid U.S. Navy deployment into combat is fraught with risk
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if the mine warfare threat is not addressed properly beforehand, and doing that will
require painful resource- and training-priority trade-offs. For the surface fleet, the
Littoral Combat Ship represents the future of U.S. Navy MCM, and the modules that
support this combat skill set ought to receive the highest procurement priority. But
the platform flexibility gained by modularity cannot be allowed to come at the cost
of lower training standards, let alone marginalization of the MCM mission. Finally,
Chinese technology appears set to render U.S. Navy helicopters and maritime patrol
aircraft as feasible targets of MIW. It is not too early to start making the tactical adjustments to meet this emerging and unprecedented threat.
•• At the operational level, it is apparent that U.S. Pacific Command lacks adequate
MCM assets, and over the last decade this vulnerability may well have encouraged
China’s MIW program. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commission’s decision to move the mine countermeasures center from Ingleside, Texas, to San Diego,
California, is a commendable first step toward remedying this discrepancy. Sending
some of these units to Pearl Harbor or even Guam would be a justifiable second step,
one that would also serve as a useful deterrent against any Chinese adventurism.
Maintaining these “legacy” ships in the force and at a high state of readiness until new
organic systems are in place and proven effective is crucial. In addition, a major reactivation of U.S. offensive mining programs, including a renewed emphasis on aerial
laying of mines by the Air Force, should be considered for a deterrent role, in order to
ensure that Chinese leaders understand the likely devastating consequences for China
of all-out mine warfare against the United States. Exercises and war games, large and
small, should incorporate significant MIW components, including a quantitatively
and qualitatively significant adversary, extensive geographic parameters, both military
and paramilitary targets, and the potential for high U.S. Navy casualties to proficient
Chinese offensive MIW. In short, they should address the realities of this Chinese
asymmetric maritime challenge.
•• At the strategic level, it is imperative that U.S. military and diplomatic leaders
understand that China already possesses more than enough capability to blockade
Taiwan.440 Moreover, China’s ability to punish the U.S. military in a Taiwan conflict
has increased radically over the last decade, in part because of the developing naval
mine threat but due to other capabilities as well. As with so many aspects of the
Chinese military challenge, geography appears to be the trump card. In this case,
there is simply no way in which the United States or its potential allies can deploy
forces adequate to interdict effectively a full-scale Chinese MIW campaign, which,
as this study demonstrates, could be vast in scope. Once mines were deployed, the
dangers to U.S. forces in-theater could be considerable. Given this threat, and particularly other major military commitments related to the global war on terror and
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continuing military operations in the Greater Middle East, Washington seemingly
has little choice but to adopt a cautious strategy concerning the Taiwan issue and face
the uncomfortable truth that it cannot feasibly defend Taiwan militarily over the long
term. A negotiating process, already reinvigorated between Taipei and Beijing since
2008, before the fact of Taiwan’s military vulnerability is demonstrated in battle, is
absolutely in the U.S. strategic interest. While supporting such a diplomatic solution,
Washington should help Taipei strengthen its MCM capabilities and encourage Tokyo
and other regional allies to maintain effective mine countermeasures forces as a hedge
against the worst case. However, allied assistance in the MCM arena is no panacea and
must not become a crutch, inhibiting the vital development of extensive U.S. Navy
capabilities in this area.
This issue of China’s naval expansion, particularly in mine warfare, is here to stay. The
challenge before us is to grasp the serious challenges in Beijing’s rapid maritime development, while also effectively preparing our naval forces in case of unexpected turbulence
in this most vital relationship.
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China’s Mine Use Options by Geographic Area. Moored and
bottom mines are generally restricted to waters of less than 200
meters depth, which suggests that a wide variety of China’s
mines could play important roles in the areas to the west and
north of Taiwan. The oceans to the west and south of Taiwan
are generally too deep for such mines, although drifting mines
or encapsulated moored mines such as the Russian PMK-2,
which China has obtained, are said to be capable of being laid
in waters as deep as 2,000 meters—particularly if outfitted with
advanced cables.
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